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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The most destructive war in human history ended with 
the dawning of the nuclear age. According to the Center 
for Defense Information (Beyond War, 1985) present 
worldwide stockpiles of nuclear weapons represent 6000 
times the destructive firepower used by all combatants in 
World War II, including the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. This is the equivalent of nearly 3 tons of 
TNT for every person on the planet today. Most of the 
nearly 50,000 nuclear warheads reside in the military 
arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union, but 
Great Britain, France, the Peoples' Republic of China, and 
India also possess nuclear weapons. Additionally, perhaps 
a dozen other countries either possess the necessary 
technology for their manufacture or are very close to 
acquiring it. 
Scenarios for global nuclear war vary widely in their 
estimates of its probable consequences. One of the most 
pessimistic scenario~ is that nearly one-half the world's 
human population (mostly in the northern hemisphere) would 
be killed outright or would die quickly from various 
injuries including radiation effects (Sagan, 1986). 
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Surviving the initial effects, millions more would then die 
from starvation and disease. The now famous TTAPS model 
(Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack, & Sagan, 1983) predicts 
that detonation of even 1% of existing nuclear weapons 
could trigger a "Nuclear Winter" leading to an immediate 
and dramatic drop in atmospheric temperature and a 
prolonged cessation of photosynthetic activity eventuating 
in the extinction of thousands of plant and animal species, 
possibly including humankind. A more optimistic scenario 
envisions an effective civil defense system that could 
shelter or relocate people away from targeted areas (Kahn, 
1984). 
In recent years there has been a rising tide of public 
concern about nuclear issues. With the deployment of new 
weapons systems by each of the super-powers, the citizenry 
of many Eastern and Western nations has developed an 
increasing awareness of the danger. In the United States 
for example, the Nuclear Freeze movement gained widespread 
support with many state legislatures and individual 
municipalities voting in favor of resolutions to halt the 
arms race or declaring themselves to be "nuclear-free 
zones." Somewhat more recently, a number of organizations 
have begun to lobby for programs to help people survive 
nuclear war. Such programs would include a comprehensive 
civil defense system and an anti-ballistic missile defense, 
the Strategic Defense Initiative proposed by President 
Reagan in 1983. 
Although these groups differ in many ways, especially 
in their support or opposition to nuclear policy issues, 
they are similar in their concern about the danger of 
nuclear war and, unlike the majority of Americans, they 
have made an active behavioral response to the nuclear 
threat. The purpose of the present study is to develop a 
better understanding of the factors that motivate 
individuals to nuclear activism. 
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For the sake of clarity, the term "antinuclear" will 
be used to refer to those who advocate a freeze or 
reduction in nuclear weapons and who believe that arms 
control is the best way to prevent nuclear war. "Pro-
defense" will refer to those who support a strong military 
and civilian defense as the preferred strategy. The term 
"activist" refers to those who have made a commitment to 
these issues by joining an organization or engaging in 
activities for the purpose of influencing others about 
nuclear issues. Thus, activists are distinguished by their 
behavior rather than their attitudes. 
Some might object that the prefix "anti" is pejorative 
(emphasizing what is opposed rather than what is proposed) 
and prefer the term "peace" activist. However, this 
characterization unfairly suggests that an opposing point 
of view is anti-peace. "Pro-disarmament" might be an 
acceptable alternative, but it, too, is imprecise. It is 
likely that many prodefense advocates would also support 
disarmament policies under certain conditions. Moreover, 
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it is likely that not all antinuclear activists would agree 
with some disarmament proposals. Imprecise as these terms 
are, they reflect the primary security concerns of each 
group. "Antinuclear" was chosen to reflect the belief that 
nuclear weapons pose the primary threat to security and 
"Prodefense" to reflect the view that nuclear weapons 
together with a system of national defense are necessary 
for national security. 
Research Relevance 
There are a number of reasons for taking a closer look 
at those who have taken a strong behavioral stance in 
support of or in opposition to various nuclear weapons 
policies. In the first place, though psychology has long 
had an interest in many of these issues (cf., Morawski & 
Goldstein, 1985; Rudmin, 1986) very few studies have 
attempted to explain the political activism of ordinary 
citizens. In part, this may be due to the relatively 
recent emergence of many of these organizations. However, 
it seems clear that nuclear activism is a large and growing 
social movement. In fact, the largest mass demonstration 
in U.S. history attracted 700,000 people to New York City 
in 1982 in behalf of a nuclear freeze. 
Though little research has been done in this area, 
somewhat more is known about antinuclear activists, 
possibly because antinuclear organizations are more 
numerous, although it is not certain that this is the case. 
To date, only three studies (Fiske, Pratte, & Pavelchak, 
1983; Locatelli & Holt, 1986; Tyler & McGraw, 1983) have 
investigated antinuclear activists and only one (Tyler & 
McGraw, 1983) included a prodefense sample. One other 
study (Wolf, Gregory, & Stephen, 1986) used a sample of 
people sympathetic to antinuclear proposals but who were 
not activists. Still, relatively little is known about 
either type of nuclear activism. 
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It is not clear to what extent present-day activists 
resemble other forms of political activism past or present. 
Certainly grass-roots citizen activism of any type is the 
exception rather than the rule (Milbrath & Goel, 1977) . 
One of the major differences between nuclear activism and 
more recent social protest movements such as the anti-war 
movement in the 1960's and 1970's is that nuclear activism 
is not primarily a university-based phenomenon. 
Antinuclear groups, for example, appear to be largely 
middle class. Many of these groups reflect the concern and 
expertise of various professional organizations, and one, 
the International Physicians for Social Responsibility, 
received the Nobel Peace Prize for its work in educating 
the public about the medical consequences of nuclear war. 
Another reason for learning more about nuclear 
activism is that it serves as one model for coping with the 
stress of the nuclear threat. There are many ways of 
coping with any stressor, some more or less adaptive than 
others, but in a time when 40% admit they are worried or 
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concerned about the possibility of nuclear war (Kramer, 
Kalick, & Milburn, 1983), it behooves us to know more about 
how people are coping with this fear. Nuclear activists 
explicitly admit their concerns (Tyler & McGraw, 1983) and 
an examination of the efficacy of their coping strategies 
may provide useful information about what has been called 
"anticipatory coping" (Lazarus & Launier, 1978) . 
Finally, because they are visible and outspoken about 
their concerns, nuclear activists may provide important 
role models for young people attempting to cope with their 
own fears and anxieties about nuclear war (Tyler & McGraw, 
1986). Studies in the U.S. and elsewhere have found that 
many young people are very frightened about the prospect of 
nuclear war (Bachman, 1983; Beardslee & Mack, 1983; 
Goldberg, Lacombe, Levinson, Parker, Ross, & Sommers, 1985; 
Goldenring & Doctor, 1984, 1986; Goodman, et al., 1983; 
Solantaus, Rimpela, & Taipale, 1984) . Studies further 
suggest that much of the anxiety young people experience is 
the result of their perceptions that adults either feel 
helpless or are apathetic about these issues (Goodman, et 
al., 1983; Greenwald & Zeitlin, 1987; Simon, 1984; Zeitlin, 
1984), and that they are greatly reassured when they become 
acquainted with adults who do not demonstrate helplessness 
and hopelessness (Myers-Walls & Fry-Miller, 1984; Snow & 
Goodman, 1984; Van Ornum & Van Ornum, 1984) . 
Despite the large numbers of people who identify 
themselves as nuclear activists, relatively little is known 
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about them. The few studies of activists that have been 
published to date have examined attitudes (Tyler & McGraw, 
1983; Wolf, Gregory, & Stephen, 1986), and cognitive images 
of nuclear war (Fiske, Pratte, & Pavelchak, 1983) . While 
these studies have identified a number of differences 
between activists and non-activists, the antecedents of 
these differences have not been closely examined. 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of the present study was to develop a more 
complete understanding of the type of individual 
behaviorally commited to nuclear activism. A few prior 
studies have described certain distinguishing 
characteristics of antinuclear activists such as particular 
attitudes (Tyler & McGraw, 1983), but the picture is far 
from complete. For example, the fact that nonactivists 
share many of these same attitudes (Locatelli & Holt, 1986) 
indicates that the attitudes that have been examined are 
not sufficient in themselves to explain activist behavior, 
at least for those in the antinuclear camp. In her review, 
Fiske (1987) notes that antinuclear activists do not differ 
markedly in most ways from the general public. That is to 
say, activists do not differ markedly in terms of the 
variables that have been examined thus far. It is possible 
that critical variables have yet to be identified. It is 
also possible that activists differ from the general public 
primarily in quantitative ways. An example might be that 
8 
activists' attitudes are not fundamentally different from 
those of most people, but the intensity with which they are 
held is different. 
The present study has attempted to develop a more 
complete model of activism by examining in greater detail 
the most promising factors that have been previously 
identified as well as additional variables that may play an 
important role. Some of these variables were derived from 
research in other areas including investigations of stress 
and coping and in studies of political participation. 
The principal dependent variables that were examined 
here include several measures of perceived threat, and the 
personal resources activists feel they bring to bear to 
influence public debate and the political process. In 
addition, this study has investigated these variables both 
quantitatively and qualitatively through questionnaires and 
in-depth interviews with both prodefense and antinuclear 
activists, as well as with individuals who favor either 
prodefense or antinuclear policies, but who are not so 
actively involved in these organizations. The primary 
comparisons in this study are between activists and 
nonactivists. Secondarily, prodefense and antinuclear 
groups will be contrasted in order to clarify their 
respective positions and to identify the ways in which 
activists in both camps resemble one another. The overall 
goal then is to develop a better understanding of the 
psychosocial antecedents to nuclear activism. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The review of the literature is divided into four 
major sections. The first will briefly review psychology's 
contributions to an understanding of the nuclear arms race. 
Section two will review research on the psychological 
implications of living with the threat of nuclear war. The 
third section examines the various responses people make to 
the nuclear threat and the factors associated with those 
responses. This includes a review of the research on 
nuclear activism and factors which are believed to mitigate 
an activist response. The final section examines in 
greater detail the factors which seem most important in 
promoting nuclear activism and which will be the primary 
focus of the present study. This section draws from the 
research on nuclear activism, political participation, and 
models of how people cope with threatening events. 
Psychology and the Arms Race 
The nuclear arms race and the ever-present possiblilty 
of catastrophic accident or war is a multi-faceted problem, 
depending as it does on historical traditions, political 
strategies, and scientific technologies. But on a 
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fundamental level, these are also psychological problems 
and deeply rooted in issues that have long been the domain 
of psychological investigation. One historian (Rudmin, 
1986) has reviewed psychology's long tradition of exploring 
the roots of human conflict and has cited the personal, 
sometimes prescient contributions of such luminaries as 
Franz Brentano, Ivan Pavlov, William James, and William 
McDougall. The years following World War II saw major 
advances in this area with research in authoritarianism, 
ethnocentrism, nationalism, prdjudice, group conflict, and 
aggression. 
The American Psychological Association (APA) was one 
of the first professional organizations to address the 
implications of nuclear war (Rudmin, 1986) . In 1945, 
Charles Osgood, Otto Klineberg, Gardner Murphy, and other 
prominent psychologists were joined by more than half of 
the APA membership and endorsed a peace petition prepared 
by Gordon Allport (Allport, 1945). And by 1947, both the 
APA and the Society for the Psychological Study of Social 
Issues had standing committees on International Peace, 
Atomic Energy, and Atomic Education (Morawski & Goldstein, 
1985). 
Although these committees were relatively short-lived, 
they provided leadership and set the agenda for much of the 
work to follow. They also agreed, at least implicitly, on 
at least two major points (Morawski & Goldstein, 1985; 
Rudmin, 1986) : First, was that problems of international 
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relations, including nuclear weapons policies were 
psychologically based problems that could be.addressed from 
expert psychological knowledge and research methodology. 
Secondly, there was a general agreement that informed 
public debate of all the many issues was necessary. 
As the nuclear threat has grown more ominous, and 
particularly during the past 25 years, many psychologists 
have begun to focus on nuclear issues directly. There are 
several reasons for this. One is that many have come to 
view the threat of nuclear war as humanity's pre-eminent 
social problem and believe that if alternatives to the arms 
race are not implemented quickly all other problems will be 
inconsequential (cf., Thomas, 1980; Walsh, 1984). 
Secondly, nuclear weapons are unique in many ways and 
nuclear war is not strictly comparable to previous wars. 
It has been argued that deterrence strategies, sensible 
perhaps with conventional armaments, are not reasonable in 
the nuclear age (Frank, 1982, 1983; Holt, 1984; Kull, 
1984) . Nuclear weapons are qualitatively different from 
conventional weapons; they are immensely more powerful and 
have widespread and persistent radiation effects. 
Moreover, missile delivery systems pose special problems. 
Their vulnerability to pre-emptive attack reduces the 
opportunity for rational decision-making and tempts leaders 
to launch them quickly at the first indication of 
provocation. The TTAPS study (Turco, Toon, Ackerman, 
Pollack, & Sagan, 1983) has demonstrated the impotency of 
nuclear weapons. No longer is it possible to inflict 
damage on one's adversary without destroying oneself as 
well. 
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The third factor which has prompted many researchers 
to look more specifically at nuclear issues is that many 
have come to believe that growing up in the nuclear age has 
predisposed recent generations to a number of problems, 
both social and individual. Among the problems most often 
cited are impulsivity and an inability to delay 
gratification (Mack, 1985), reluctance to make commitments 
to others and to the future (Goodman, Mack, Beardslee, & 
Snow, 1983}, materialism and self-indulgence (Frank, 1984}, 
depression and anxiety (Nelson, 1985}, drug use (Newcomb, 
1986}, and suicide (Rogers, 1982}. 
The largest body of work to date has attempted to 
understand the underlying causes of international hostility 
and the nuclear arms race. In this vein, a number of 
analysts have emphasized the role of outdated ideas 
(Deutsch, 1983; Frank, 1982, 1983}, faulty assumptions 
(Holt, 1984; Milburn, 1961; Tetlock, 1983}, and inflexible 
cognitive processes (Glad, 1984; Holt, 1984; Kull, 1984} . 
Many have pointed to the role of nationalism and sought to 
explicated its roots in motivational (Frank, 1961; 
Menninger, 1983; Moyer, 1985; Stein, 1985; Volkan, 1985}, 
perceptual (Deutsch, 1962; Osgood, 1961; Stagner, 1961; 
White, 1968, 1984}, and psychosocial factors (Deutsch, 
1983; Erikson, 1985; Mack, 1981, 1984; Pinderhughes, 1979}. 
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In the early 1960's, a number of psychologists sought 
to devise specific programs to bring the arms race under 
control (Deutsch, 1961; Katz, 1961; Milburn, 1961; Russell, 
1961) . Perhaps the most ambitious work in this areas was 
done by Charles Osgood (1961, 1962). Recognizing mistrust 
as a major component in the arms race, he formulated a 
program to gradually reduce mistrust between nations. His 
proposal, known as GRIT (Graduated Reciprocation in 
Tension-Reduction), called for unilateral reductions in 
armaments. GRIT emphasizes that mutual trust need not be a 
prerequisite to successful arms reduction. Rather, either 
side can initiate the process independently without 
jeopardizing its own security, and trust can develop as the 
other side is encouraged to respond in kind. 
Work in these areas continues today, however, recent 
years have seen the emergence of a new focus of empirical 
investigation. Inspired by the research of Escalona (1965) 
and Schwebel (1965) psychologists have begun to examine the 
psychological implications of living with the threat of 
nuclear war. 
The Psychological Impact 
of the Nuclear Age 
Interviewing people around the country Carey (1982) 
inquired about childhood memories of "the bomb" and civil 
defense exercises. Most had vivid recollections of the 
Cuban missile crisis, reports of contaminated food 
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products, school evacuation exercises, and fear of nuclear 
war. Although few of these people identified themselves as 
activists, many admitted they were still haunted by these 
childhood experiences and continued to experience a sense 
of apprehension years later. 
Several studies in the early 1960's found surprisingly 
widespread and intense fears of nuclear war among school-
age children. Asking open-ended questions about attitudes 
toward war and civil defense measures, Schwebel (1965, 
1982) queried 3000 students following the Berlin crisis in 
1961, and repeated the study with 300 students the 
following year during the Cuban missile crisis. He found 
that war was very much on the minds of these students and 
that most admitted being afraid. In both studies students 
reported feeling helpless, angry, and pessimistic about the 
future. Many admitted that they tried not to think about 
the future at all. In her study shortly after the Cuban 
crisis, Escalona (1965, 1982) asked 250 students about 
their hopes and expectations for the future. Prompted by 
no references to war or to nuclear weapons, more than 70% 
of the students mentioned the bomb and most painted a 
pessimistic picture of their future. 
In a related study, Adams (1963) inquired about the 
social concerns of children and youth and found a 
surprising interest in U.S.-Soviet relations. Four 
thousand students ranging in age from 10 to 19 years were 
asked to identify the single greatest problem facing the 
U.S. More than 65% cited international problems and war 
with the Soviet Union was the most frequently identified 
concern at every age level. 
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Retrospectively, it seems reasonable to expect such 
heightened concern among young people, especially 
considering the events then taking place. At that time, 
however, the fact that children were even aware of the 
larger social environment was an unexpected finding 
(Escalona, 1982) . Simple as their research was, both 
Schwebel and Escalona speculated that the threat of nuclear 
annihilation might exert an insidious influence on healthy 
psychological development. 
Recent studies continue to support the findings of 
Schwebel, Escalona, and Adams that large numbers of young 
people are very frightened about the possibility of nuclear 
war and pessimistic about their future. To date, research 
has been conducted in the United States (Bachman, 1983; 
Beardslee & Mack, 1983; Goldenring & Doctor, 1984, 1986; 
Goodman, Mack, Beardslee, & Snow, 1983), Canada (Goldberg, 
Lacombe, Levinson, Parker, Ross, & Sommers, 1985), Finland 
(Solantaus, Rimpela, & Taipale, 1984), the Soviet Union 
(Chivian, Mack, Waletzky, Lazaroff, Doctor, & Goldenring, 
1985), and Columbia (Ardila, 1986) among others. 
Despite differences in sampling procedures and 
methodology these studies support a number of conclusions. 
Foremost is that significant numbers of children and 
adolescents are concerned, worried, and fearful about the 
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possibility of nuclear war. Ranging from a significant 
minority to the large majority, young people respond to 
general inquiries about the future with references to 
nuclear war. When questions ask specifically about nuclear 
issues, the number expressing concern increases. Secondly, 
there are age differences: children are more anxious than 
adolescents and younger teens are more anxious than older 
teens. Finally, there are national differences with young 
people from a Third World country (Columbia) and a non-
aligned nation (Finland) expressing the highest levels of 
anxiety. 
Family studies have added further support for the 
claim that the nuclear threat exerts negative psychosocial 
influences on people of all ages. In his clinical work 
with families, Simon (1984) has observed the unsettling 
effect the subject of nuclear war has on open family 
discussion. Most parents are reluctant to share their 
personal feelings, and often discourage their children's 
expressions as well. 
Allerhand (1965) and his colleagues interviewed 200 
families and found that while more than 70% of these 
parents reported that their children had voiced fears about 
nuclear issues, fewer than half had actually talked with 
their children about these fears. Allerhand concluded that 
while young people are keenly aware of international 
tensions and social crises, adults "are at best 
uncomfortably available" to respond helpfully (p. 129). He 
viewed these parents as a microcosm of a larger society 
that, because of denial or emotional numbing, was equally 
unprepared to address the object of these concerns, i.e., 
the nuclear arms race. 
Zeitlin (1984) believes that in many instances 
children actually collude to protect their parents. 
Through extensive family interviews he observed that: 
The large majority of parents feel over-whelmed by 
the nuclear issue, and many children, although 
troubled, are protecting their parents by not 
bringing up their concerns, by saying they are not 
really bothered, or even by reassuring their own 
worried parents (p. 26). 
17 
Zeitlin describes this role reversal (where children 
protect the parents) as a "collapse of generational 
boundaries" (p. 26). In effect it is an implicit admission 
by all parties that, in a world threatened by nuclear 
holocaust, adults are no longer capable of offering 
reasonable assurances of protection and care. Moreover, it 
entails a recognition that social organization, maybe even 
life itself, is in jeopardy. As Simon (1984) has written, 
"This is more than a fear of personal death. It is a fear 
that nullifies all human aspirations and all commitments to 
the future" (p. 6). 
Parents and adults may wish to avoid discussing these 
issues for fear they can offer nothing helpful or may even 
add to the anxiety of young people. This perception was 
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expressed by many parents in a series of interviews with 
twenty-five families (Greenwald & Zeitlin, 1987) . Without 
exception, however, younger children were quite eager to 
talk. They freely expressed their feelings and ideas and 
were reassured by hearing their parents and older siblings 
do the same. In these interviews, older adolescents tended 
to be more reserved at first. Until they were assured that 
their parents were really willing to listen and to speak 
honestly themselves, teens often remained silent or even 
denied an interest in the subject. Whenever parents 
expressed their own feelings, even feelings of fear and 
vulnerability, adolescents did the same. 
Studies of family interactions around the subject of 
nuclear war suggest that adults, too, have a great deal of 
anxiety about these issues. They are reluctant to discuss 
them with their children, and in many cases, reluctant to 
think about them at all. Greenwald and Zeitlin (1987) 
believe that much of the anxiety experienced by these 
parents is a reflection of their own developemental issues, 
specifically, what Erikson (1963) calls generativity needs. 
In a narrow sense this is a "concern in establishing and 
guiding the next generation" (p. 267). In a large_r sense, 
however, generativity manifests as a concern about the 
world at large and "Care for the creatures of this world" 
(p. 267-268). 
The implications of the present research are that the 
shadow cast by the potential for nuclear war is having an 
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adverse effect on optimal psychological development. While 
it is premature to conclude that nuclear anxiety promotes 
frank, psychological illness, the last 25 years has seen a 
dramatic increase in depressive illness among children, 
adolescents, and young adults ("Depression", 1987). And at 
least one study has reported a strong correlational 
relationship between nuclear anxiety, depressive symptoms, 
and drug use among older adolescents and young adults. 
The real concern of many psychologists, however, 
points to more subtle and insidious influences. Escalona 
(1982) argues that the failure of society, collectively and 
individually, to address the nuclear issue in a way that 
offers realistic hope serves to undermine the trust that 
young people have in adult leadership, in social and 
political institutions, and diminishes optimistic 
expectancy about the future. She has stated her position 
concisely: 
Growing up in a social environment that tolerates and 
ignores the risk of total destruction by means of 
voluntary human action .tends to foster those patterns 
of personality functioning that can lead to a sense of 
powerlessness and cynical resignation (1982, p. 601). 
She goes on to predict that, beyond the effects on the 
individual, these circumstances "can render the next. 
generation less well equipped to avert actual catastrophe" 
(p. 601). 
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Responses to the Nuclear Threat 
Although the anti-nuclear movement has grown rapidly 
in recent years, the fact is that relatively few people 
have made a behavioral commitment to this issue in spite of 
opinion polls which suggest widespread concern in the 
general public (Fiske, 1987). This section will review what 
is known about the kinds of behavioral responses people 
make toward nuclear issues beginning with an examination of 
some of the factors believed to mitigate activism. The 
second part will review the empirical research on nuclear 
activism and delineate the factors that are known to 
distinguish activists. The third and final part of this 
section will examine additional variables drawn from other 
areas of social science research that appear to be relevant 
to this topic. 
Explaining Inactivism 
Public opinion surveys have chronicled American 
attitudes about nuclear issues for over four decades 
(Kramer, Kalick, & Milburn, 1983) . In their survey of this 
opinion research, Kramer and his colleagues found that in 
1956 approximately 14% of the public reported they worried 
often or worried a great deal about nuclear war. By 1982 
this figure had risen to 28%, or about one adult in four. 
Since 1946, between two-thirds and three-fourths of 
Americans has believed that any major military 
confrontation with the Soviet Union would result in nuclear 
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war (Kramer, et al., 1983). Local samples of urban adults 
reveal that on the average people estimate a chance of one 
in two (Fiske, Pratte, & Pavelchak, 1983) to one in three 
(Tyler & McGraw, 1983) of personally experiencing a nuclear 
war. Finally, the large majority of Americans believes 
that nuclear war is neither survivable nor winnable 
(Yankelovich & Doble, 1984) . Given these kinds of 
responses, many psychologists have tried to explain the 
apparent complacency of the general public (Goldman & 
Greenburg, 1982; Lifton, 1982; Mack, 1981, 1982; Nelson, 
1985) . 
One explanation might be that people are simply 
uninformed about nuclear issues (Nelson, 1985) . This is 
somewhat supported by evidence that people, young and old, 
are not very knowledgeable about nuclear technologies or 
policy matters (Cooper, 1979; Schwebel, 1982; Zweigenhaft, 
1985) . On the other hand, responses to opinion surveys 
suggest that most people feel they have sufficient 
information to voice an opinion. Furthermore, with the 
frequent media coverage of many of these issues it would 
seem to require more effort to avoid information than to 
obtain it. 
Because the world has never experienced the kind of 
nuclear exchange envisioned by modern military strategists, 
nuclear weapons are said to be have a quality of 
psychological unreality (Frank, 1980) or to be unimaginable 
(Mack, 1982). Frank (1980) suggests that because nuclear 
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weapons have not been used in more than 40 years, we have 
become habituated to the danger. The implications are that 
these types of psychological processes undermine the sense 
of danger that is necessary to provoke and sustain an 
adaptive response to the nuclear threat (Frank, 1980; Mack, 
1980). 
A motivational explanation favored by many clinically 
minded psychologists involves some form of denial or 
repression (Lifton, 1982; Moyer, 1985; Nelson, 1985; 
Salguero, 1983) . These responses are often effective at 
reducing anxiety and inner turmoil, but may impede more 
adaptive responses. In the face of real danger, anxiety is 
a powerful motivator for survival (Goldenring & Doctor, 
1986) . Avoidance strategies such as denial and repression 
may provide psychological comfort in the near-term, but at 
the expense of effective survival strategies in the long-
term (Goldenring & Doctor, 1986; Suls & Fletcher, 1985; 
Walsh, 1984) . 
Lifton (1980, 1982) coined the term psychic numbing to 
describe a process whereby feelings are divorced from the 
awareness of danger. Psychic numbing is neither denial nor 
repression in the classic sense for there is cognitive 
awareness, but without the appropriate emotional components 
to mediate an active response. Lifton believes that the 
nuclear threat requires such extraordinary coping 
responses: "In order to go about business as usual, one 
has to deaden one's feelings about what one knows" (1980, 
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p. 332). 
Most of these explanations for inactivism have yet to 
be tested empirically, and in some cases it is not clear 
how they could be tested. Indirect evidence does suggest, 
however, that there is a quality of unreality about nuclear 
war. For example, first person accounts of the bombing of 
Hiroshima (Lifton, 1968; Thurlow, 1982) differ sharply from 
the kinds of images the average American has of nuclear war 
(Fiske, et al., 1983). When asked what nuclear war might 
be like, subjects queried by Fiske and her colleagues 
responded with rather general, abstract descriptions of 
death and destruction lacking much detail. Hiroshima 
survivors, in contrast, were quite specific in their 
descriptions and largely reported human misery. 
A final category of factors which undermine or prevent 
nuclear activism might be termed "conflicts" (Milbrath & 
Goel, 1977). These include lack of resources (e.g., time, 
money, etc.), prior commitment to other causes, or 
attitudes which conflict with activists' goals. 
To summarize, while concern about nuclear weapons and 
the potential for nuclear war appears to be growing, many 
psychologists have been more impressed by the lack of a 
greater public outcry. And, although many explanations 
have been offered, little research has attempted to go 
beyond opinion surveys at this point. Perhaps it should 
not be surprising that relatively few people have taken an 
active position on these issues for political scientists 
generally find that low levels of political participation 
are the rule (Milbrath & Goel, 1977) . 
Antinuclear Activism 
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Investigations of the characteristics of nuclear 
activists are relatively few at this point. Almost all 
have focused on antinuclear activism, and some have used 
antinuclear "sympathizers" rather than activists; only one 
study has included a sample which might resemble prodefense 
activism in some respects. This section will review this 
research and the factors that have been shown to be 
associated with these particular responses to the nuclear 
threat. 
Fiske, Pratto, and Pavelchak (1983) hypothesized that 
the kinds of mental images people have about nuclear war, 
as well as the emotions accompanying these images might 
have a bearing on nuclear attitudes and political activity. 
In a stratified random sample of urban adults, they found 
that people identifying themselves as antinuclear activists 
did show differences in their images of nuclear war. 
Overall, abstract images were more common than concrete 
images, but activists were more likely to describe concrete 
rather than abstract images. 
Examples of abstract images included general 
references to death, destruction, or to life after nuclear 
war. Concrete images included similar themes but were much 
more detailed. Images were judged to be concrete when they 
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included the death of specific people or vivid descriptions 
of injury, death, and efforts to survive. 
Contrary to the expectation that antinuclear activists 
would have more negative emotions associated with images of 
nuclear war, this study found that affective referents were 
uniformly negative for both activists and nonactivists. In 
both groups, education showed a weak, positive correlation 
with the number but not the type of emotional associations. 
Factors such as race, gender, and occupation were not 
correlated with either activism, types of images, or 
emotions. Nor was there any relationship between activism 
and either age or education. Activists were found to have 
a somewhat higher level of general political participation, 
however. 
In a study that examined two types of nuclear 
activism, Tyler and McGraw (1983) compared antinuclear 
activists with survivalists and a control sample of non-
active adults. Subjects completed a questionnaire which 
asked about policy opinions (support for a nuclear freeze 
and use of nuclear weapons), worry about nuclear war, 
attitudes about the likelihood, prevention, and survival of 
nuclear war, and efficacy (i.e., belief in the ability to 
influence political decision-making) . 
Compared to the control group, antinuclear activists 
were more likely to support a nuclear freeze, to reject the 
use of nuclear weapons, to worry about nuclear war, and to 
make higher estimates of its likelihood. Antinuclear 
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activists also expressed a higher sense of efficacy, felt a 
moral responsibility for their activism, and believed that 
while nuclear war is preventable, it is not survivable in a 
meaningful sense. 
While agreeing with the antinuclear activists that the 
risk of nuclear war is high, the survivalist group did not 
view it as preventable. They did, however, believe it to 
be survivable with appropriate preparation. In general, 
this group supports a strong nuclear posture, believes the 
use of nuclear weapons may be justifiable, and scores low 
on measures of political efficacy. 
Locatelli and Holt (1986) were interested in Lifton's 
construct psychic numbing. They compared college students 
who were active in antinuclear organizations with 
nonactivist students who were sympathetic to antinuclear 
policies such as a nuclear freeze. These two groups were 
compared according to feelings of political efficacy, 
political powerlessness, perception of nuclear threat, and 
emotional responses to the television movie The Day After 
which dramatizes nuclear war. 
The researchers reasoned that psychic numbing should 
be negatively associated with good mental health and that 
activists would be less prone to emotional numbing than 
nonactivists. The critical variable in this regard was the 
kinds of emotional reactions subjects reported after 
watching The Day After. Contrary to the expectation that 
activists would report more emotional reactions this was 
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not the case. The only emotion significantly more likely 
to be reported by nonactivists was a feeling of 
helplessness. From this the authors concluded that there is 
no evidence that psychic numbing is widespread. Other 
findings were that political efficacy is unrelated to 
activism, but that political powerlessness (negatively 
correlated) and perceptions of threat (positively 
correlated) are related. 
The final study reviewed here investigated the 
relationship of threat perception and efficacy in support 
for antinuclear activism and examined Protection Motivation 
Theory as a model for predicting activism (Wolf, Gregory, & 
Stephen, 1986). Protection Motivation Theory predicts that 
fear-arousing messages will promote self-protective 
behaviors on the basis of judgements about threat and 
efficacy. Threat is operationally defined as a function of 
the likelihood and severity of an event and is measured by 
separate judgements of each, so that an event judged to be 
unlikely or not severe would be less likely to evoke a 
self-protective response than an event estimated to be both 
likely and severe. 
In a similar fashion, efficacy is a function of two 
types of judgements. The first, termed self-efficacy, is 
one's belief that he or she is capable of performing a 
particular coping response. The second, response-efficacy, 
is the belief that a given response will effectively 
prevent an unwanted outcome. In this model, efficacy will 
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be highest when a person judges that he or she is able to 
perform a given activity and when that activity is believed 
to be effective. Efficacy will be low whenever a person 
doubts the effectiveness of a given action or does not 
believe he or she can perform it satisfactorily. 
Protection Motivation Theory was developed as a model 
to explain the willingness of people to alter health or 
safety habits such as quitting smoking or wearing seatbelts 
(Wolf, et al., 1986). Implicit is the notion that fear 
(threat) alone is not sufficient to inspire behavioral 
change. While alterations in long-standing health 
behaviors are unlikely to occur without a reasonable level 
of fear or threat, it is also important for people to 
believe that a recommended course of action will be 
effective in reducing the threat and to believe that they 
can successfully follow that course of action. Thus, the 
motivation to engage in a particular activity (such as 
quitting smoking) will be highest when people are convinced 
that ill-effects are both likely and severe and when they 
believe that they can successfully follow a course of 
action that will effectively mitigate the hazard. 
Reasoning that this model might be useful in 
predicting responses to the threat of nuclear war, Wolf and 
her colleagues devised an experiment to test it. College 
students completed questionnaires before and after the 
movie The Day After. Pre-test questionnaires asked about 
attitudes and emotions pertaining to nuclear war, and asked 
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subjects to make estimates of the probability and severity 
of nuclear war. Following the televised drama a post-test 
repeated pre-test measures and added questions about 
response efficacy (i.e., efficacy of various actions often 
used by antinuclear activists designed to reduce the 
probability of nuclear war), self-efficacy (perceived 
ability to engage in those activities), and the expressed 
intention to become involved in efforts to reduce the 
probability of nuclear war (behavioral intention) . 
Results showed no changes between pre-test and post-
test for either those who watched or did not watch the 
movie. Viewers differed from non-viewers, however, by 
affirming greater intention to engage in nuclear war 
prevention activities. Finally, expressed intentions to 
engage in antinuclear activities were found to be highest 
when both threat measures (severity and likelihood of 
nuclear war) were judged high, and response efficacy was 
more strongly correlated with behavioral intention than 
self-efficacy. The best overall predictor of behavioral 
intention to work to prevent nuclear war was response 
efficacy. 
Each of these studies has a number of strengths as 
well as the weaknesses that efforts to investigate new 
territory always have. Reliance on convenient samples, 
questionnaire data, and measurement instruments with 
unknown validity and reliability are unfortunate, but 
sometimes unavoidable in preliminary investigations of this 
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nature (cf., Fiske, 1987). From a methodological 
standpoint, the studies by Fiske and her associates (1983) 
and by Tyler and McGraw (1983) are the strongest. Fiske, 
et al., conducted random phone interviews and appeared to 
obtain a representative demographic sample of adults in a 
large urban community. Those identifying themselves as 
anti-nuclear activists were compared to the majority 
respondents. 
Tyler and McGraw examined two types of behavioral 
responses to the nuclear threat; antinuclear activists and 
survivalists were compared with a contol group. Although 
they may share important behavioral and attitudinal 
characteristics with other types of nuclear activists, 
survivalists do not meet the criteria for activism as 
defined in the present study. That is, their primary goals 
do not include efforts to influence public thinking or 
political decision-making about nuclear issues. 
Locatelli and Holt (1986) surveyed college students, 
comparing those identified as antinuclear activists with 
antinuclear sympathizers (nonactivists supportive of 
certain antinuclear policies) . Their thesis that 
nonactivists would demonstrate reduced emotional reactivity 
(psychic numbing) to a dramatization of nuclear war was not 
supported and suffered perhaps from a sampling population 
that was too narrow. It may be that the formation of firm 
nuclear policy opinions precludes the degree of psychic 
numbing the authors expected to find among nonactivists. 
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Another possibility is that the television dramatization 
was sufficiently compelling to overcome the emotional 
resistance described by Lifton's construct. Still, the 
comparison of activists with sympathetic nonactivists is a 
potentially useful way to clarify the motivational bases of 
activism over and above particular policy opinions. 
In some respects the most theoretically appealing 
study was done by Wolf and her colleagues (1986). Although 
they did not actually investigate activists, they attempted 
to extend a theoretical model developed in another area to 
an understanding of nuclear activism. A shortcoming of 
this model is that it may not predict actual behavior; 
however, it seems to predict a motivational predisposition 
(aka behavioral intention) to perform certain self-
protecti ve coping responses. The Protection Motivation 
model predicts that intentions to engage in self-protective 
behaviors are a function of the threat induced by a fear 
arousing message and the perceived efficacy of of available 
coping responses. 
In Wolf's study the fear arousing message was a 
fictional television account of nuclear war. Although 
appraisals of threat and efficacy were positively 
correlated with viewing the dramatization and with 
behavioral intentions to engage in actions to prevent 
nuclear war, flaws in the design prevented a complete test 
of the model. The foremost problems were that subjects 
were not randomly assigned to viewer and non-viewer groups 
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and behavioral intentions were measured only on a post-
test. It seems likely that those most inclined to 
participate in war-preventing activities would also be most 
inclined to view the movie. Despite these shortcomings, 
this study is useful for the analysis it offers about the 
relationship between perceptions of threat and efficacy, 
and the responses which follow from those perceptions. 
Summary 
It is difficult to generalize from so few studies and 
ones which differ as these do; however, a number of 
tentative conclusions may be drawn. Antinuclear activists 
appear to have more concrete mental images of nuclear war 
(Fiske, et al., 1983) and to feel more threatened by its 
possibility (Locatelli & Holt, 1986; Tyler & McGraw, 1983; 
Wolf, et al., 1986). Antinuclear activists also feel more 
efficacious about preventing nuclear war (Tyler & McGraw, 
1983; Wolf, et al., 1986), but no more efficacious about 
the political process than nonactivists (Locatelli & Holt, 
1986) although they may be somewhat more politically active 
in general (Fiske, et al., 1983). Finally, antinuclear 
activists do not seem to be more emotional about nuclear 
issues than the general public (Fiske, et al., 1983), but 
they may be less prone to feelings of helplessness 
(Locatelli & Holt, 1986) . 
It is not yet clear whether antinuclear activists are 
more radical in their policy preferences than the general 
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public; Fiske (1987) believes they are not, while Tyler and 
McGraw (1983) find some support that they are. It is 
clear, however, that prodefense activists disagree with 
many of the policy positions advocated by antinuclear 
groups. Beyond this, little can be said about prodefense 
activists though they may share certain attitudinal 
similarities to survivalists who make relatively high 
judgements about the probability of nuclear war and feel 
less efficacious than antinuclear activities (Tyler & 
McGraw, 1983) . 
The Psychosocial Correlates 
of Nuclear Activism 
In order to arrive at a more complete understanding of 
the motivational and cognitve factors which contribute to 
nuclear activism, the present study has focused on 
estimates of threat posed by nuclear war, and several 
measures of efficacy. This section examines these 
variables in greater detail in order to develop the 
hypotheses that are the subject of this study. 
Threat 
In terms of the psychological factors which promote 
nuclear activism, estimations of threat are consistently 
associated with antinuclear activism. Whether measured as 
the amount of worry (Tyler & McGraw, 1983), concern 
(Locatelli & Holt, 1986), probability of nuclear war (Tyler 
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& McGraw, 1983; Wolf, et al., 1986), severity (Wolf, et 
al., 1986), chances of survival (Tyler & McGraw, 1983), or 
the specificity of mental images of nuclear war (Fiske, et 
al., 1983), people who feel most threatened by nuclear war 
seem most likely to engage in antinuclear efforts. 
To what extent appraisals of threat also play a role 
in prodefense activism is not yet clear. Because 
prodefense activism has not been examined previously, this 
study has tentatively assumed that prodefense activists 
share certain important characteristics with survivalists 
in terms of the ways they appraise the threat of nuclear 
war. Like antinuclear activists, survivalists believe the 
likelihood of nuclear war is high; unlike antinuclear 
activists, however, they believe that nuclear war is 
survivable. 
The distinction that the probability of nuclear war 
can be. judged high while its severity may be judged 
relatively low parallels the appealing formulation by 
protection motivation theorists (Wolf, et al., 1986} that 
perceptions of threat are based on independent but 
interactive appraisals of an event's probability and its 
severity. Threat appraisals will be highest when both 
probability and severity are judged high. If survivalists 
exemplify prodefense activists in this respect, the 
protection motivation model may be extended to provide an 
understanding of prodefense activism as well as antinuclear 
activism. 
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Following this reasoning, the present study has 
measured probability and severity judgements separately. 
Relevant hypotheses are that both antinuclear and pro-
defense activists are motivated in part by their greater 
estimations of the probability of nuclear war and that they 
will diverge on estimates of the severity of nuclear war. 
Specifically, it is hypothesized that both prodefense and 
antinuclear activists will make higher estimations of the 
probability of nuclear war than their nonactive 
counterparts {i.e., those who advocate either prodefense or 
antinuclear policies but do not actively lobby for their 
support) . Secondly, it is hypothesized that antinuclear 
activists will make higher estimates of the severity of 
nuclear war than will prodefense activists. 
If judgements about the probability of nuclear war are 
critical to an active behavioral response to the nuclear 
threat, we still do not have an explanation for why people 
differ in their estimates of probability. Research into 
the ways that people make probabilistic judgements shows 
that most do very poorly in assessing the likelihood of 
even mundane events {Anderson, 1980) . Psychologists have 
identified a number of heuristics and biases people use in 
judging probability {Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and have found that even 
knowledgeable experts succumb to these biases (Anderson, 
1980; Kahneman, et al., 1982). In truth, no one knows 
whether a large-scale nuclear will occur, and no one can 
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precisely judge its probability. However, to the extent 
that people do seem to make judgements of this kind, and to 
the extent that those judgements play a role in nuclear 
activism, it would be useful to know more about how they 
are made. 
Studies of responses to stress indicate that 
judgements of threat are complex and dynamic (Lazarus & 
Launier, 1978) . In their model describing how people 
respond to stressful or threatening events, Lazarus and 
Launier emphasize the role of two kinds of cognitive 
evaluations they call "primary" and "secondary" appraisals. 
These terms are somewhat misleading and do not imply 
relative importance or a temporal relationship (p. 306) . 
Primary appraisal is an evaluation one makes of the 
significance of an event in terms of one's wellbeing. Such 
appraisals range from irrelevant to benign-positive to 
stressful (p. 302-303). Stressful appraisals can be 
further classified as those that have already happened 
(harm/loss), those that are anticipated (threats), or those 
that are viewed as an opportunity for mastery or gain 
(challenges) . 
Secondary appraisal is an evaluation of the resources 
and options one can mobilize to cope with stress or threat. 
Secondary appraisal influences not only the activities 
(e.g., information seeking or behavior change) of the 
person under stress, but it also influences primary 
appraisal processes (p. 306). For example, if one believes 
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he or she is well-equipped to deal with an event, that 
event may be viewed as irrelevant or even positive. 
Another person, based on a different assessment of 
available resources, may feel very threatened by a similar 
situation. 
The importance of this, for our purposes, is that 
estimates of threat are not independent judgements. 
Rather, they depend to some extent on the kinds of 
responses people believe they can legitimately make. When 
options are few, or are constrained in some way, an 
objectively dangerous circumstance may not be subjectively 
viewed as harmful or threatening. An example is the oft-
heard statement: "There's really nothing I can do so I 
might as well not think/worry about it." On the other hand, 
the availability of resources and response-options makes it 
more likely that a judgement of threat will be made and 
corrective action taken. 
Lazarus and Launier's model offers a possible 
explanation for the differential estimates of threat people 
make about nuclear war. It predicts that people are more 
willing to appraise nuclear war as threatening when they 
believe they have reasonable coping strategies available to 
them than when they do not. This model dovetails with 
observations that have been made about general political 
behavior and nuclear activism with respect to efficacy. 
Efficacy 
One factor that is consistently associated with 
political participation beyond the simplest level is 
efficacy (Milbrath & Goel, 1977) . Efficacy has also been 
related to nuclear activism in some studies (Tyler & 
McGraw, 1983; Wolf, et al., 1986), but not in others 
(Locatelli & Holt, 1986). 
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A general definition of efficacy is the belief that 
one is capable of wielding influence (Milbrath & Goel, 
1977) . For research purposes efficacy is usually defined 
more narrowly as the belief that one is capable of 
influencing political decision-making (Milbrath & Goel, 
1977), the belief that certain activities would be 
effective (Wolf, et al., 1986), or the belief that one is 
capable of carrying out certain activities (Wolf, et al., 
1986) . Again, Protection Motivation Theory offers a more 
precise explanation of the kinds of judgements that 
contribute to a sense of efficacy (Wolf, et al., 1986). 
Response-efficacy is the belief one has about the 
effectiveness of particular behaviors or activities; self-
efficacy is the belief about one's capacity to perform 
these behaviors. 
Two studies found a strong positive relationship 
between efficacy and activism, another did not. The 
differences appear to be a function of how efficacy was 
defined and measured in each case. The study that found no 
relationship (Locatelli & Holt, 1986) used an an instrument 
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designed to measure beliefs about the responsivity of the 
political system to individuals. Studies that found a 
positive relationship inquired about the viability of 
particular activist-related behaviors. Tyler and McGraw 
found that when people believe that ordinary citizens can 
contribute to preventing or surviving nuclear war, they are 
more likely to engage in those activities. In their study 
Wolf and her associates did not study activists per se, but 
they found that people are more motivated to engage in 
antinuclear activities when they believe that those actions 
are likely to be effective (response-efficacy) and when 
they believe they are able to perform those activities 
(self-efficacy) . 
The relationship between efficacy judgements and 
nuclear activism has been directly addressed in the present 
study. As others have noted (cf., Milbrath & Goel, 1977; 
Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Wolf, et al., 1986), both general 
political activism and antinuclear activism presuppose a 
political system that is responsive to direct citizen 
input. Following the example of Wolf, et al., this study 
will measure self-efficacy and response-efficacy 
separately. Self-efficacy is defined as an individual's 
belief in the responsivity of the social and political 
environment to lobbying efforts by concerned and committed 
individuals. Response-efficacy is defined as belief in the 
effectiveness of specific strategies typically employed by 
grassroots political movements. 
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The general expectation is that nuclear activists, 
like other types of political activists will score higher 
on measures of efficacy than nonactivists. The question 
arises then whether antinuclear activists and prodefense 
activists will demonstrate similarly high levels of 
efficacy. Professor Rambo (personal communication) has 
argued that prodefense activists may show higher levels of 
response-efficacy because the prodefense position is more 
nearly in the political mainstream than the policies 
favored by antinuclear groups. 
Since the end of World War II, the overwhelming 
political and public sentiment has favored parity, if not 
superiority, over the Soviet Union in nuclear weaponry. 
Simply stated, national security has been equated with the 
possession and willingness to use massive numbers of 
nuclear weapons. Only recently have some begun to 
challenge this orthodoxy by questioning whether more 
nuclear weapons actually provides greater security. The 
general concensus among antinuclear activists is that they 
do not. 
The greater point, however, is the extent to which 
each of these two activist camps believes that public 
sentiment and the political system will be receptive to 
their own viewpoint on national security. It may be that 
recent breakthroughs in U.S.-Soviet relations and arms 
negotiations between the superpowers have buoyed 
expectations among antinuclear activists about their access 
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to and influence upon the political dialogue. A realistic 
appraisal might find such a conclusion premature, however. 
The strategy of strong nuclear deterrence capabilities has 
prevailed for nearly a half-century, the rationale being 
that a strong military defense insures security. The logic 
is both simple and appealing: If you are strong, no one 
will attack you. Furthermore, it stands within a 
centuries-old tradition of political thinking that a 
strong, well-armed military deters aggression (cf., White, 
1968). 
Changing this type of thinking, as many antinuclear 
activists hope to do, will be a long, uphill battle, and 
one, that if appraised realistically, might chasten 
antinuclear activists about their prospects and result in 
somewhat lower levels of efficacy. Specific hypotheses 
regarding efficacy were that nuclear activists would 
demonstrate greater beliefs in self and response efficacy 
than their respective nonactivist counterparts. Further, 
it was expected that while both antinuclear and prodefense 
activists would report similarly high levels of self-
efficacy, prodefense activists would express higher levels 
of response-efficacy than antinuclear activists. 
Purpose of the Study 
The present study attempts to provide a more complete 
understanding of the motivational factors which lead some 
people to make an active commitment to nuclear issues. Of 
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particular interest were those individuals who have made 
the decision to ally themselves with others and with 
organizations which champion particular nuclear and defense 
policies i.e., prodefense and antinuclear activists. This 
study builds on and extends prior research in a number of 
ways: First, unlike several of the previous studies, this 
one sampled from a number of organizations and included 
only those activists who have made a substantial personal 
commitment to their respective causes. Secondly, activists 
were compared on several measures with people who held 
similar views, but who were only nominally affiliated with 
nuclear organizations. Third, prodefense proponents have 
been studied for the first time. And finally, in addition 
to questionnaire data, each subject was personally 
interviewed in order to get a more complete understanding 
of his or her opinions and motivations. 
Previous research, though limited, indicates that 
perceptions of threat and efficacy are fundamental to an 
activist posture. The most precise formulation of these 
variables derives from Protection Motivation Theory (Wolf, 
et al., 1986) and from the work of Lazarus and Launier 
(1978) . Protection Motivation Theory states that each is a 
function of two separate judgements: Estimations of threat 
are composed of estimates of probability and severity, 
while efficacy is composed of judgements of self-efficacy 
and response-efficacy. Moreover, according to the model 
proposed by Lazarus and Launier, threat is dynamically 
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related to efficacy. When people believe their options are 
few (low efficacy) they make lower judgements of threat. 
When options are available (high efficacy) judgements of 
threat are made more readily. 
As yet, neither of these models has been applied to 
nuclear activism. Lazar~s and Launier developed a general 
theory of adaptation from research unrelated to political 
activism. Wolf and her colleagues did not study nuclear 
activists directly, but found that subjects making higher 
estimates of both threat and severity were more likely to 
indicate intentions to engage in some type of nuclear war 
prevention activity. This study investigated the 
relationship of these variables to two types of nuclear 
activism. 
With the exception of Tyler and McGraw (1983) no other 
study has investigated prodefense activism and it is not at 
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all clear that the survivalists queried by Tyler and McGraw 
are truly representative of a pro-defense posture. 
Although they can be counted among those who have made an 
active behavioral commitment to the nuclear threat 
survivalists are few in number and do not lobby for 
particular nuclear policies. Their efforts are primarily 
confined to preparing for their own survival in the event 
of nuclear war. In contrast, prodefense activists 
represent a legitimate, albeit small, political movement 
advocating particular solutions to the nuclear threat. 
Generally speaking, survivalists do not view political 
action as an effective mechanism for change (Tyler & 
McGraw, 1983) . The present research examined both 
prodefense and antinuclear activists, comparing them with 
one another and with subjects who favor similar policies 
but who are not activists. 
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Because so little research has been done in this area 
and because in no previous study did investigators actually 
talk with subjects about their beliefs, interviews were 
seen as a potentially valuable way to explore new ground. 
In the present study the principal hypotheses were measured 
with a standard questionnaire, following which each subject 
was interviewed in order to corroborate the questionnaire 
data and to provide an opportunity for subjects to reveal 
unanticipated information bearing on their motivation for 
nuclear activism. 
Hypotheses 
1. It is predicted that both prodefense and antinuclear 
activists will make higher estimations of the probabilty of 
nuclear war than will nonactivists. 
2. On judgements of the severity of nuclear war, those by 
antinuclear activists will be highest and those by 
prodefense activists will be lowest while nonactivists will 
make intermediate judgements. 
3. Activists will make higher appraisals of personal, 
political and response efficacy than nonactivists. 
4. Prodefense activists will make higher appraisals of 
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response efficacy than antinuclear activists. 
5. Activists will report greater personal concern and make 
higher estimates of public concern about nuclear war than 
nonactivists. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
A number of important events took place in the several 
months during which this study was being developed and the 
data was gathered. Many of these events were topically 
related to issues addressed in the study and had a 
substantial influence on those who volunteered to 
participate. It may be helpful, therefore, to briefly 
recount some of these occurences in order to place this 
investigation in its appropriate historical context. 
The months preceding the period of data collection 
(which began in October, 1988 and ended in April, 1989) 
were full of news reports about changes within the Soviet 
Union, superpower summit meetings and arms reduction talks. 
Secretary General Gorbachev had begun to implement a number 
of domestic proposals referred to collectively as glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (restructuring) and the Soviets 
announced they would withdraw their troops from Afghanistan 
by February, 1989 (which they did). Mr. Gorbachev and 
President Reagan met in May, 1988 and again in December to 
discuss ways to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and to reduce 
nuclear armaments. 
The first of these arms treaties, the Intermediate 
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Nuclear Forces (INF) accords was negotiated early in 1988 
and ratified by the U.S. Senate in time to be signed during 
Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Washington in December of that 
year. The INF agreement required the U.S. and the S.U. to 
withdraw and destroy a class of intermediate-range missiles 
sited in Europe. Even before INF was signed, a host of 
other arms proposals were being discussed, including 
limiting the number of strategic (i.e., long-range) and 
cruise missiles, withdrawing troops from Europe and the Far 
East, and abandoning anti-missile and anti-satellite 
programs such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) . 
All-in-all, this was a period in which the superpowers 
seemed to be forging a new relationship and the more 
adventurous were beginning to speculate about the end of 
the Cold War (Krauthammer, 1988). Almost weekly there were 
new proposals, counter-proposals, signs of hope and 
warnings to be cautious. It was in this context that this 
study was completed. The people who participated in this 
study, perhaps more than the average American, followed 
these events closely and throughout the interviews they 
made frequent references to these and related occurences. 
Subjects 
Subjects were 60 adult men and women recruited from 
the membership roles of political organizations active in 
the metropolitan area of a large Western city. 
Organizations were chosen because they were primarily or 
48 
substantially involved with issues of nuclear and defense 
policies. In most cases these activities involved either 
political lobbying on behalf of particular policies, public 
education, or both. 
Subjects were classified into one of four groups on 
the basis of their attitudinal position (Prodefense or 
Antinuclear) and according to their level of organizational 
participation (Active or Nonactive) . Attitudinal position 
was evaluated by a set of items in the questionnaire which 
measured subjects' support for particular policies deemed 
to be representative of either a prodefense or antinuclear 
posture. To be included in the research, prodefense 
subjects were selected if they endorsed two of three items 
on the questionnaire in favor of SDI, civil defense, or a 
strong nuclear deterrence. Similarly, subjects in the 
antinuclear groups were required to endorse two of three 
questions supporting either nuclear arms treaties, a "no 
first use" policy, or a mutual freeze on the testing and 
deployment of nuclear weapons. In the large majority of 
cases, subjects in each category registered support for all 
three of the classification questions. 
Frequency of group participation was used to evaluate 
the individual's commitment to the cause of either the 
antinuclear or prodefense position. Depending on their 
level of participation subjects were judged as either 
Active or Nonactive. To be included in the Active groups, 
subjects must have attended or participated in at least 
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three organizational events in the preceding six months. 
This minimum criteria was easily exceeded by all subjects 
in the active groups. In most cases these subjects were 
very involved in their groups' projects and participated in 
at least one event or activity per month. In many instances 
Active subjects worked on a weekly or even daily basis to 
promote their groups' efforts. Subjects in the Nonactive or 
sympathetic groups were only nominally involved with 
nuclear issues although, according to the attitudinal 
criteria, they were generally well-informed and had 
strong opinions on these issues. In most cases they did 
little more than maintain group affiliation although many 
were actively involved in other political and para-
political organizations such as local and state political 
parties, and advocacy groups concerned with issues such as 
womens' rights, abortion, education and the environment. 
To summarize, the two major classification variables 
were Position (Prodefense or Antinuclear) and Activity 
(Active or Nonactive) . Subjects were assigned to one of 
four groups on the basis of their attitudinal position and 
their level of commitment to that position. Hence, four 
groups of 15 subjects were constructed: Antinuclear 
Activist, Prodefense Activist, Antinuclear Nonactivist, 
and Prodefense Nonactivist. The ages of subjects ranged 
from 19 to 78 years with a mean age of 47.4 years. By 
groups, mean ages were 44, 47, 50, and 49 years for 
Antinuclear Activists, Antinuclear Nonactivists, Prodefense 
50 
Activists, and Prodefense Nonactivists, respectively. The 
demographic characteristics of subjects by group are 
summarized in Table 1. 
An effort was made to include approximately equal 
numbers of men and women in the study even though some of 
the groups from which subjects were recruited did not 
reflect an equal gender balance. For example, it was found 
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that men compromised the large majority of members among 
the prodefense groups; among antinuclear organizations men 
and women were approximately equal although, overall, women 
tended to be more active than men. For the purposes of 
this study it was judged more important to examine the 
views of men and women equally rather than to reflect the 
true membership or these organizations. Hence, subjects 
were selected in a way to achieve similar numbers of men 
and women in each category without regard to their actual 
distribution in targeted organizations. Overall, 33 men 
and 27 women were interviewed. Prodefense organizations 
contributed 17 men and 13 women while 16 men and 14 women 
were recruited from antinuclear organizations. 
No effort was made to control for socioeconomic 
differences such as education or occupation. Rather, these 
factors were simply tabulated for each subject and by 
group. It is not known to what extent these factors are 
representative of the membership of the larger 
organizations from which subjects were drawn. As can be 
seen from Table 1 no subject had less than a high school 
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education and all but four subjects had pursued college or 
technical education beyond high school. Substantial 
differences in both education and occupation can be seen, 
however. More than half the subjects in the antinuclear 
groups had earned postgraduate degrees while 2 of 30 
subjects in the prodefense groups had postgraduate degrees. 
Similarly, professional occupations were represented more 
frequently in the antinuclear groups than in the prodefense 
groups. 
Information on political party affiliation and 
liberalism-conservatism has also been included in Table 1. 
As can be seen, most antinuclear subjects identify 
themselves as Democrats while most prodefense subjects 
belong to the Republican party. The majority of those who 
are listed as "Other" identified themselves as 
Independents. Among antinuclear subjects almost two-thirds 
view themselves as liberal or very liberal while 80% of 
prodefense subjects view themselves as conservative or very 
conservative. 
To summarize, subjects were recruited from a number of 
organizations actively involved with issues of nuclear 
weapons and defense policies. Subjects were classified 
according to whether they held antinuclear or prodefense 
attitudes and according to their level of commitment to 
working on behalf of their beliefs. An effort was made to 
recruit approximately equal numbers of men and women. As a 
whole, antinuclear subjects were well-educated with more 
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than half holding postgraduate degrees; the majority were 
employed in professional occupations. Most antinuclear 
subjects identified themselves as liberal and were 
affiliated with the Democratic party. Prodefense subjects 
were somewhat less educated and fewer were employed as 
professionals. Most had some college education and 40% 
were college graduates. Prodefense subjects were slightly 
older, affiliated with the Republican party, and most 
identified themselves as conservative. 
Procedure 
Subjects were recruited primarily from the membership 
of various prodefense and antinuclear organizations. In a 
few cases subjects were recommended by others who had 
previously participated in the study. An important goal 
was to recruit subjects from as many organizations as 
possible in order to sample opinions as broadly as 
possible. Most of the antinuclear subjects were drawn from 
local chapters of national organizations such as Educators 
for Social Responsibility, Beyond War, SANE/Freeze, and the 
Union of Concerned Scientists. A smaller number of 
subjects were recruited from local or regional peace 
groups. Prodefense organizations tended to have fewer 
members and most were local rather than national. An 
exception was the High Frontier organization which lobbies 
for SDI and has a national membership. Local groups 
primarily work to build support for programs such as SDI, 
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civil defense, or a strong military. 
Because of the greater number and size of available 
antinuclear organizations, the prospective pool for 
subjects in these groups was quite large and far larger 
than the pool of subjects belonging to prodefense 
organizations. The size of the study was limited somewhat 
by the relatively small number of people meeting the 
criteria for inclusion in one of the two prodefense groups 
and by the decision to keep the size of each research group 
the same. Therefore, recruitment was stopped when 15 
qualified subjects were enlisted in each group. 
Prospective subjects were contacted, usually by 
telephone, and asked if they would be willing to 
participate in a survey about a variety of national 
security issues. It was explained that responses would be 
anonymous and confidential and that the time requirement 
would not exceed one. hour. In response to those who wanted 
more information, the experimenter explained that he was 
doing research for a university degree and that he wanted 
to interview only people who were interested in policies 
and issues related to national security and who had made an 
effort to inform themselves about these issues. As a rule, 
those individuals most actively involved with either 
prodefense or antinuclear organizations were very receptive 
to participate in the study. Nominally active individuals 
sometimes expressed initial reservations about whether they 
were appropriate candidates. In these cases it was 
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explained that the questions weren't of a technical nature 
and that active group involvement was not essential. 
Prospective subjects were further reassured that they could 
withdraw at any time they desired. In most cases this 
explanation proved sufficient and only two people that were 
contacted declined to participate in the study. 
Data were collected in two parts: a written 
questionnaire was followed by an oral interview. The 
questionnaire was preceded by written instructions which 
reiterated that responses would be confidential and 
anonymous (see Appendix A) . With the subjects' permission, 
interviews were recorded to facilitate accurate 
transcription after which the tapes were erased and reused. 
Information regarding the study's specific hypotheses 
was withheld from subjects prior to the study's completion 
because such information might have induced a response 
bias. There was no reason to believe that participation in 
the study would involve any risk to the well-being of the 
subjects and no adverse psychological reactions were 
reported. To the contrary, most subjects in each group 
reported that they enjoyed and appreciated the opportunity 
to think about and discuss these issues. 
Typically, subjects were interviewed in their homes, 
at their places of business, or in a public location such 
as a restaurant. All interviews were conducted between 
October, 1988 and April, 1989. Following completion of the 
study, a summary of the research results was mailed to 
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interested subjects. 
Instruments 
Questionnaire 
The questionnaire used a Likert-type format to measure 
each of the principal dependent variables. These variables 
are as follows: (a) probabilistic estimates of nuclear war 
under a variety of scenarios, (b) estimates of the severity 
of nuclear war, (c) general political efficacy, 
(d) personal resources, (e) response efficacy, (f) nuclear 
policy commitments, and (g) perceptions of concern about 
nuclear war. Each variable was assessed using multiple 
items designed to measure the hypothetical construct. In 
most cases these items have been used elsewhere (cf., 
Fiske, et al., 1983; Locatelli & Holt, 1986; Tyler & 
McGraw, 1983; Wolf, et al., 1986). In some cases the 
questions were rephrased to fit better within the chosen 
response format. 
Following the example of Wolf, et al., (1986) 
subjective experiences of threat posed by the potential for 
nuclear war was hypothesized to consist of two independent 
components of probability and severity. Consequently, each 
was measured separately. The Probability Scale consisted 
of six items reflecting belief in the likelihood of various 
nuclear war scenarios. The Severity Scale consisted of two 
items reflecting belief in the likely consequences to self, 
family, and nation should nuclear war occur. 
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Efficacy measures were scaled separately for general 
political efficacy, personal resources, and response 
efficacy. The General Political Efficacy Scale was made up 
of three items tapping belief in the responsivity of the 
political system to individuals. Personal Resources 
measured the extent to which subjects felt they had the 
time and financial resources to commit themselves to work 
in this area. The Response Efficacy Scale consisted of 11 
items asking subjects to judge the overall effectiveness of 
strategies that are commonly used by grassroots political 
organizations including many nuclear activist 
organizations. 
Questions regarding support or opposition to 
particular nuclear policies were assessed with a set of 16 
items. These items were devised to reflect a number of 
contemporary policy positions frequently advocated by 
either prodefense or antinuclear organizations. Among 
these items were those used to to classify subjects into 
either Prodefense or Antinuclear groups. The final items 
on the questionnaire inquired about perceptions of general 
and personal concern about nuclear war and the extent to 
which subjects discussed these issues with other family 
members. The research questionnaire is reproduced in 
Appendix B. 
Interview 
Interview items were designed to allow subjects to 
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elaborate further on issues raised in the questionnaire. 
Questions addressed the likelihood and consequences of 
nuclear war, thoughts and plans for protecting self and 
family in the event of nuclear war, attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union, and family dialogue about these topics. An 
effort was made to give subjects as much time as they 
wanted to discuss these issues and in general interviews 
were completed between 45 and 90 minutes. A standard list 
of questions was used for all subjects (see Appendix C); 
however, the order in which questions were asked varied 
somewhat from subject to subject in order to make the 
questioning flow more smoothly. In addition, many subjects 
were asked questions that were prompted by their responses 
and which were not a part of the standard protocol. The 
interview protocol was viewed as an outline of topics to 
discuss and each interview proceeded somewhat differently 
depending the willingness and interest of the subject to 
discuss each topic. Typical interviews have been 
reproduced in Appendix D. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Research results have been summarized in two parts. 
The first section contains the quantitative analyses of the 
questionnaire scales and tests of the major hypotheses. 
Research scales were analyzed for group differences using a 
three-factor (Position x Activity x Items) analysis of 
variance with repeated measures on the third factor (Winer, 
1971). Position has two levels: Antinuclear and 
Prodefense; the two levels of Activity are Active and 
Nonactive. The number of levels on the repeated factor, 
Items, ranged from 2 to 11 depending on the scale. 
Treating the scale items as repeated measures has the 
advantage of allowing a more detailed item by item analysis 
when either a significant main effect or an interaction is 
observed for that factor. In these cases, Neuman-Keuls 
tests of individual comparisons have been performed to 
identify those items in each group that contributed most to 
differences that were obtained. 
In those cases where tests of variance-covariance 
homogeneity indicated that the required conditions were not 
present in the data, the appropriate corrections were made 
using the Huynh-Feldt procedure. This procedure reduces 
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the degrees of freedom for the sums of squares and prevents 
an overly liberal alpha level for tests of significance. 
In the second part of this section, the qualitative 
analyses of the interviews are reviewed. 
Quantitative Analyses 
The Probability Scale asked subjects to rate the 
likelihood of nuclear war within different time periods and 
under different hypothetical scenarios. Contrary to the 
prediction that subjects in the Activist groups would make 
higher probability estimates than Nonactive groups, no such 
difference was found, F(l,56) = .01, E > .93. However, for 
all items, probability estimates made by the Antinuclear 
groups exceeded those made by the Prodefense groups. A 
difference approaching statistical significance was 
observed as a function of Position, F(l,56) = 3.58, 
p = .064, thus indicating that those who express negative 
sentiments toward nuclear armaments tend to perceive a 
greater likelihood of nuclear war. 
Further analysis revealed a significant Position by 
Item interaction, F(4,220) = 2.54, p < .05. This led to a 
simple effects analysis which found that Antinuclear groups 
made higher probability judgements on two of the six items. 
Antinuclear groups judged higher likelihood of nuclear war 
within one's lifetime, F(l,56) = 7.15, p < .05 and expected 
war to occur as a result of some type of accident or 
malfunction, F(l,56) = 9.66, p < .01. Of all the scenarios 
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presented, nuclear war by the turn of the century was 
judged least probable by each group. (Although the groups 
did not differ significantly, mean scores were 3.13 for the 
Prodefense Nonactive group, 3.00 for Prodefense Active 
group, and 3.60 for each of the Antinuclear groups.) the 
scenario all groups judged most likely to lead to nuclear 
war was one in which the U.S. and the S.U. are drawn into a 
regional conflict initiated by non-superpower nations. On 
this item, group scores clustered between fairly likely and 
very likely. Again, groups were not significantly 
different; mean scores ranged between 4.13 for Prodefense · 
Activists and 4.47 for Antinuclear Activists. 
The greatest difference between respondents in the 
Prodefense groups and those in the Antinuclear groups was 
observed on the question about the potential for a 
technical accident to lead to nuclear war. This situation 
was judged to be fairly unlikely by Prodefense groups (M = 
3.10) and fairly likely by Antinuclear groups (M = 4.07). 
The Severity scale consisted of two items asking 
subjects to estimate the probability that they and their 
families and the U.S. as a nation would survive nuclear 
war. The hypothesis that antinuclear advocates perceive 
nuclear war to be more catastrophic than do those who favor 
a prodefense posture was supported, F (1,56) = 68.78, 
p < .001. Subjects in the Antinuclear groups believe that 
survival of self/household and the nation is very unlikely; 
Prodefense subjects are much more optimistic and judge the 
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chances of survival to be fairly likely in both cases. 
A second hypothesis about severity estimates predicted 
that Antinuclear Activists would judge severity highest 
followed by the Antinuclear Nonactivists, Prodefense 
Nonactivists, and finally, the Prodefense Active group. 
The predicted order of severity estimates was observed; 
however, Neuman-Keuls comparisons revealed that there was 
no significant difference between either of the Antinuclear 
groups or between either of the Prodefense groups. (Mean 
scores across Severity items was 5.10 and 5.06 for 
Antinuclear Activists and Antinuclear Nonactivists and 3.34 
and 3.00 for Prodefense Nonactivists and Prodefense 
Activists, respectively. The difference between total 
group scores for the two Prodefense groups was 10 while the 
Antinuclear group scores differed by 1. In each case the 
necessary critical value was g.95(2,56) = 19.60.) 
Several hypotheses were made regarding the concept of 
Efficacy. With regard to General Political Efficacy, 
Personal Resources, and Response Efficacy, it was 
hypothesized that Activist subjects would demonstrate 
greater efficacy than Nonactive subjects. Results 
supported the hypothesis for Personal Resources, but not 
for the other two efficacy constructs. 
General Political Efficacy measured the extent to 
which subjects believe that individual citizens can 
influence national decision-making and the political 
process. For General Political Efficacy (GPE), no 
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difference was found between Active and Nonactive groups, 
F(l,56) = .28, E = .598. However, there was a trend in the 
direction of greater GPE for Prodefense groups, F(l,56) = 
3.45, p = .068. 
Personal Resources examined the extent to which 
subjects had the time and money to work on behalf of their 
beliefs about nuclear issues. Data support the hypothesis 
that people most actively involved in the work of their 
member organizations are more likely to feel they have the 
personal resources to support their work, F(l,56) = 28.93, 
p < .001. A significant main effect for Items revealed 
that all groups perceived time to be more available than 
money, F(l,56) = 10.78, p < .002. 
Response Efficacy measured the degree to which 
subjects believe a variety of political strategies are 
effective in furthering organizational goals. Two 
predictions were made with regard to this construct. 
First, it was hypothesized that subjects in the Active 
groups would rate these political strategies as more 
efficacious than Nonactive subjects. Second, Prodefense 
Activists were predicted to evaluate these strategies more 
favorably than Antinuclear Activists. Neither hypothesis 
is supported by the data. No difference was found on the 
basis of Activity, F(l,56) = .45, E > .05, and the mean 
evaluations for the Antinuclear Activist group and the 
Prodefense Activist were almost identical, 3.88 and 3.90, 
respectively. However, significant Position by Item 
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interaction, F(7,391) = 2.08, E < .02, revealed that 
responses as a function of Position were not consistent 
throughout the scale. Simple effects analysis found 
greater belief in the efficacy of civil disobedience among 
the Antinuclear groups than among the Prodefense groups, 
F(l,56) = 9.16, p < .01. All other strategies were judged 
similarly (moderately effective) by Prodefense and 
Antinuclear groups. 
Next, two items queried the extent to which people can 
decrease the likelihood of nuclear war and the extent to 
which people can protect themselves from the adverse 
consequences of nuclear war. It was predicted that 
Antinuclear groups would be more optimistic about the 
former while Prodefense groups would be more optimistic 
about the latter. The expected Position by Item 
interaction was found, F(l,55) = 31.05, p < .001; however, 
simple effects analysis revealed that while Antinuclear 
Activists tended to be more optimistic about preventing 
nuclear war, there was no statistical difference between 
Antinuclear and Prodefense groups, F(l,55) = 1.33, p > .05. 
There was, however, a large difference in the expected 
direction on the question concerning protection against the 
potential devastation of nuclear war, F(l,55) = 30.72, 
p < .01. In sum, while both Antinuclear and Prodefense 
groups judge prevention to be a worthy strategy, Prodefense 
groups were slightly more favorable toward self-protection 
(M = 3.5) than toward prevention (M = 3.2). Antinuclear 
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groups, in contrast, support preventive efforts (M = 3.53) 
but are very pessimistic about surviving nuclear war 
(M = 1. 90) . 
The last hypothesis examined perceptions of concern 
about nuclear war. Items asked subjects to estimate the 
level of concern about nuclear war among the general 
public, the frequency with which they personally think 
about nuclear war, and the extent to which they personally 
feel anxious. It was predicted that Active groups would 
make higher ratings in each area. However, the data do 
not clearly support this conclusion, F(l,55) = 2.28,· 
p = 1.37. Instead, there was a significant main effect for 
Position, F(l,55) = 6.59, E < .01 indicating that, overall, 
Antinuclear groups perceive greater public and personal 
concern about nuclear war than do Prodefense groups. This 
conclusion is tempered, however, by a significant Activity 
by Item interaction, F(2,97) = 3.44, p < .05. The 
subsequent simple effects analysis found that those in the 
Activist groups think about nuclear war more often, 
F(l,55) = 4.23, p < .05 and tend to experience more 
anxiety, F(l,55) = 3.65, E < .06. 
The best way to interpret these results is to consider 
public and personal concern separately. While Antinuclear 
subjects perceive greater public concern about nuclear war 
than do Prodefense subjects, the activists in each camp 
report greater personal concern (thinking and worrying) 
than the nonactivists. Among the four groups, Antinuclear 
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Activists report the greatest amount of thinking and 
anxiety while Prodefense Nonactivists report the least. In 
each case, scores for Prodefense Activists and Antinuclear 
Nonactivists are nearly identical. 
Finally, a group of questions dealt with specific 
policies or proposed policies relating to nuclear 
armaments. No specific hypotheses were made, but responses 
to certain items were among the criteria used to select 
research subjects. Policy items were analyzed individually 
using a 2 x 2 (Position x Activity) analysis of variance. 
All but 1 of 16 policies revealed a significant main effect 
for Position with F values ranging from 27.15 to 362.64 at 
p < .001. Antinuclear subjects favor or strongly favor 
mutual freeze, arms treaties, unilateral freeze, unilateral 
nuclear reduction, No First Use, decreased military 
spending, and bilateral reductions of both short and long-
range missiles. Prodefense subjects favor or strongly 
favor SDI and ground based missile defenses, crisis 
relocation plans, shelters, strong nuclear deterrence, and 
increased weapons research. They are also in favor of 
bilateral reductions in long-range missiles, but less 
strongly than Antinuclear subjects. All groups strongly 
support proposals to reduce the transfer of nuclear 
technology to Third World and non-nuclear nations. Table 2 
summarizes the mean scores of combined Prodefense and 
Antinuclear groups for each nuclear policy. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
In summary, questionnaire responses were used to 
evaluate hypotheses about group differences. Contrary to 
expectation, Activist groups did not exceed Nonactive 
groups in estimations of the probability of nuclear war. A 
Position by Item interaction revealed that Antinuclear 
groups made significantly higher estimates on two 
Probability items. Severity of nuclear war, as measured by 
estimates of survival, revealed that, as expected, 
Antinuclear groups expect nuclear war to be more severe 
than Prodefense groups. It was also hypothesized that 
Activists would demonstrate a greater sense of efficacy as 
measured by three separate efficacy scales. Only in the 
case of Personal Resources was this hypothesis supported. 
In the other two cases, General Political Efficacy and 
Response Efficacy, no overall statistical differences were 
observed; however, there was a trend in the direction of 
greater belief in political efficacy by Prodefense 
subjects, and Antinuclear subjects were found to be more 
sympathetic toward civil disobedience. 
Another hypothesis predicted that Antinuclear subjects 
would view prevention of nuclear war as more feasible while 
Prodefense subjects would see more value in protective 
measures. According to responses, Antinuclear and 
Prodefense groups did not differ on the feasibility of 
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preventive activities, but Prodefense groups were 
significantly more likely to believe in protective efforts. 
The final hypothesis predicted that those in the Activist 
groups would perceive a greater concern about the danger of 
nuclear war. Instead, however, Antinuclear groups were 
found to perceive greater concern on the part of the 
general public while Activists reported greater personal 
concern. The final set of items found large differences 
between the types of nuclear and defense programs supported 
or opposed by Prodefense and Antinuclear groups. 
Interview Results 
After completing the questionnaires, each of the 60 
research subjects was interviewed individually. Although 
no specific hypotheses were formulated with regard to the 
interviews, some of these questions parallel interest areas 
highlighted by the research questionnaire and it was 
expected that interview responses would generally support 
the questionnaire findings. An important reason for 
interviewing subjects was to provide the opportunity for 
them to discuss these issues in their own words, 
unrestrained by the questionnaire's topics or multiple-
choice format. The primary reason for conducting 
interviews, however, was to gather information that could 
not have been anticipated in the questionnaire. Although 
research has begun to identify the motivational 
characteristics of nuclear activists it was anticipated 
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that interview data would reveal additional factors. 
As noted previously, those in the Active groups were 
generally quite willing, if not eager, to volunteer for the 
study while many of those who were nominally active 
expressed mild initial reservations about their suitability 
for inclusion. As a rule, subjects in the Active groups 
seemed to articulate their positions more easily and 
usually provided greater detail in their responses. The 
probable explanation is that those who were most actively 
involved in their respective organizations were more likely 
to have thought through these issues before and may have 
been more comfortable and confident in expressing 
themselves. In fact, many of the activist subjects were 
experienced in speaking publicly on behalf of their own 
beliefs or for their organizations. Those in the Nonactive 
groups, on the other hand, were rarely more than nominally 
involved in either prodefense or antinuclear organizations 
and tended to give briefer, less specific responses. 
At the conclusion of the interview, demographic 
information was gathered on each subject. In addition to 
the personal data which was reviewed earlier, information 
about organizational membership was also obtained. In most 
cases, subjects in the Active groups were very active while 
those in the Nonactive groups did little more than 
contribute financially or maintain affiliation. All 
activist subjects reported at least monthly involvement 
with some organizational project or activity, and most were 
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considerably more active. One-third reported daily or 
near-daily work on behalf or their group. One final 
difference was that Antinuclear Activists tended to have 
the longest history of organizational commitment with 13 of 
15 reporting membership greater than 5 years. In every 
other group a few subjects reported a similar period of 
affiliation, but the majority in each case reported 
organizational membership of two years or less. 
Interview results have been summarized separately for 
each question. The complete list of interview questions 
has been reproduced in Appendix C. 
1. Why do you believe the likelihood of nuclear war is 
by the year 2000? What leads you to this 
conclusion? 
This question recalls the subject's answer to the 
first item of the research questionnaire (response options 
were not possible, very unlikely, fairly unlikely, fairly 
likely, very likely, and almost certain) and asks them to 
explain the basis of their estimations of nuclear war's 
probability. As noted earlier, responses to this and other 
Probability questions were divided on the basis of Position 
(Prodefense or Antinuclear) rather than Activity (Active or 
Nonactive) . 
Two-thirds of the subjects in each of the prodefense 
groups regard nuclear war as unlikely (i.e., fairly 
unlikely, very unlikely, or not possible) and the majority 
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of these rate it very unlikely. The remaining one-third 
view nuclear war as either fairly likely, very likely, or 
almost certain. Antinuclear groups, in contrast, were 
evenly split on estimates of the probability of nuclear war 
with half in each group rating it as likely and half rating 
it unlikely. In addition to the fact that a smaller 
proportion of antinuclear subjects regard nuclear war as 
unlikely, those who do rated it as somewhat less improbable 
than their prodefense counterparts. Whereas 16 of the 21 
prodefense subjects who rated nuclear war as unlikely said 
it is either very unlikely or not possible, 12 of the 15 
antinuclear subjects who view it as unlikely answered 
fairly unlikely. 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Table 3 summarizes the probability estimates for each 
group. It will be recalled, however, that these 
differences are not statistically significant and of all 
Probability items this was judged least likely by each 
group. 
Of more interest are the explanations subjects gave 
for their beliefs about the probability of nuclear war. 
Among those (both prodef ense and antinuclear) who view 
nuclear war as unlikely, there was substantial agreement 
that nuclear weapons are too destructive to use in military 
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combat. Moreover, these subjects believe that the leaders 
and citizenry of nuclear capable nations share this view 
and that the fear of nuclear war deters the use of nuclear 
arms. In addition, many antinuclear respondents reported 
feeling increasingly optimistic because of improving 
relations between the U.S. and the s.u. They are 
encouraged by what they feel is a growing public awareness 
of the potential for a catastrophic nuclear war and believe 
that government and military leaders in both nations are 
similarly convinced that the use of nuclear weapons would 
be folly. They implied an expectation that those in 
leadership positions will behave logically and rationally 
and used terms like "suicidal" and "unwinnable" to describe 
nuclear conflict. Prodefense subjects were not similarly 
encouraged by recent peace talks. They expressed grave 
misgivings about Soviet intentions and many stated that the 
S.U. believes it can achieve its objective of undermining 
the U.S. through subversion rather than resorting to direct 
aggression or war. 
Greater diversity of opinion was reported by those 
subjects in all groups who view nuclear war as likely. 
Most of those in the prodefense groups base their 
judgements on an enemy, namely the S.U., they view as 
aggressive, hostile, and imperialistic. Many stated that 
the s.u. secretly believes it can win a nuclear war and 
that the U.S. would readily capitulate to a pre-emptive 
attack. Three subjects (all in the Prodefense Nonactive 
72 
group) based their judgement that nuclear war is likely on 
Biblical predictions of catastrophic wars. (Two of these 
judged nuclear war as almost certain; the other said very 
likely.) 
Among antinuclear subjects who believe that nuclear 
war is likely, the most frequently cited reason was the 
potential for accidents, either through some type of 
technical malfunction, human error, misunderstanding, or 
miscommunication in time of crisis. Others were primarily 
concerned about the numbers of weapons in nuclear arsenals 
worldwide, nuclear proliferation in the Third World, and 
the potential for regional conflict. 
2. If the U.S. became involved in a nuclear war, how do 
you imagine it might, happen? What is the most likely 
scenario? 
Although people were asked to choose the most likely 
scenario, many gave more than one answer. Interestingly, 
those who judged nuclear war to be unlikely were no less 
willing to pose nuclear war scenarios than those who judged 
it likely, though the latter offered more responses. 
Additionally, antinuclear groups produced somewhat more 
responses (n = 42) than did prodefense groups (n = 32) . 
For antinuclear subjects the dual possibilities of 
accident or regional conflict loom as the most likely 
causes of nuclear war and almost all mentioned one or both. 
The most detailed scenarios envisioned some combination of 
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the two. Antinuclear subjects fear that the superpowers 
might become entangled in a Third World conflict and, as 
tensions rise, the tolerance for error decreases as the 
possibility of misunderstanding or technical malfunction 
increases. (The Korean and Iranian airliners that were 
inadvertantly shot down by the S.U. and the U.S., 
respectively, were recalled by several subjects as examples 
of the ways in which technical or command systems fail when 
tension and stress is high.) Several said they were even 
more concerned about major accidents in the Third World or 
the S.U. where safety mechanisms may not be as stringent. 
The possibility of terrorism was the third most frequently 
mentioned scenario by subjects in each antinuclear group. 
Among prodefense subjects, Soviet aggression was cited 
as the most likely cause of nuclear war by a large margin. 
Two-thirds of those in the Prodefense Activist group and 
half of those in the Prodefense Nonactive group regard this 
as the most likely scenario. (Again, most of these 
subjects reject the idea that nuclear war is probable, but 
if it happens, they believe that Soviet aggression will be 
the trigger.) Subjects in both prodefense groups foresee 
the possibility of a surprise attack on selected U.S. and 
NATO military installations rendering the West unable to 
retaliate. The possibility of Third World or regional 
conflict precipitating a nuclear war was the second most 
often cited scenario in each group and accounted for almost 
one-third of responses. (In every group, the Middle East 
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is seen as the most troublesome region by far, but the 
Indian subcontinent, Asia, and South America were also 
identified as potential hotspots.) Accidents, which 
accounted for more than half the nuclear war scenarios 
related by antinuclear subjects, were of little concern to 
prodefense subjects. Technical malfunction or human error 
were mentioned by only one subject in each prodefense 
group. 
These explanations are consistent with the results 
from the questionnaire where the possibility of regional 
conflict leading to nuclear war was judged the most likely 
scenario by all groups. Furthermore, the possibility of 
accidental nuclear war was one of the two scenarios on 
which Antinuclear and Prodefense groups differed 
significantly. 
3. If the U.S. were involved in a nuclear war, what do 
you think the consequences would be for you and your 
family? 
This question parallels the Severity Scale items on 
the questionnaire and as expected differences along 
attitudinal lines were marked in the responses subjects 
provided to this question. Antinuclear subjects in both 
groups anticipate a worst-case scenario and almost none 
expect they would survive. Prodefense subjects, on the 
other hand, believe that if nuclear war occurs it will be 
relatively limited and they are more optimistic about 
personal survival. 
Most prodef ense subjects envision a nuclear conflict 
largely confined to a few key military bases and expect 
major population centers to be spared. This view holds 
that while the s.u. is commited to conquest it is not 
interested in destroying the U.S. Rather, its objectives 
are to overthrow the U.S. government and take control of 
its resources, both natural and commercial. Thus, most 
prodefense subjects believe that a large-scale nuclear 
attack on the U.S. would be counter-productive to Soviet 
goals and very few accept the notion of an extended or 
"global" nuclear war. 
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Concerning the personal consequences of nuclear war, 
differences were observed between the Prodefense groups, 
however. Activists appear to be more confident about 
survival than their Nonactive counterparts. By a large 
majority (n = 11), Prodefense Activists believe they will 
survive nuclear war. (Four in this group have actually made 
extensive survival plans for themselves and their 
families.) In contrast, only one-third of Nonactivists 
(n = 5) expressed confidence about survival. Slightly more 
than half (n = 8) said they didn't know or that the 
consequences would depend on how close they happened to be 
to the missile targets. (These subjects do not believe 
that a large scale war will occur, but wonder if strategic 
sites in their area will be targeted and jeopardize their 
lives.) Beyond personal survival, prodefense subjects 
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anticipate a variety of difficulties in the wake of nuclear 
war. Most expressed concern about radioactive fallout, 
food shortages, economic hardship, and political 
uncertainty. Many expect they'd have to relocate to less 
contaminated areas. 
Antinuclear subjects are much more pessimistic about 
nuclear war. They do not believe it would end quickly or 
be limited to selected military targets. All but one 
subject in these two groups described nuclear war in 
catastrophic terms. They firmly believe that if nuclear 
war begins it will be an allout war; nations will launch 
their missiles at the first sign of conflict rather than 
risk having them disabled by enemy missiles. These 
subjects talk about global effects, nuclear winter, and 
speculate that human civilization may end, if, in fact, all 
biological life is not destroyed. When pressed, 
antinuclear subjects are willing to allow that short-term 
survival may be possible with preparation or luck, but most 
do not believe long-term survival is probable. Moverover, 
they do not believe it would be desirable; in fact, most 
said they wouldn't want to be among the survivors of 
nuclear war considering the aftermath they envision. 
4. Have you ever considered the possibility of nuclear 
war when making decisions about the future, such as where 
to live, etc.? 
This question was included to elicit past concerns 
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about nuclear war, concerns which might have affected past 
behavior. It was hypothesized that some individuals no 
longer anxious about nuclear war might have formerly been 
concerned enough to have made certain personal decisions on 
the basis of those concerns. The clause "such as where to 
live, etc." primed respondents to think in terms of 
decisions about personal survival and it was anticipated 
that more prodefense subjects would reply affirmatively. 
In fact, this proved not to be the case. Only in the 
Antinuclear Activist group did a majority of subjects (n = 
8) report that the possibility of nuclear war had affected 
past behavior in some way. Seven said that their concerns 
about the future were primarily responsible for their 
involvement in the cause of nuclear activism. The other 
subject reported having postponed parenthood and a career 
decision because of her uncertainty about the future. The 
remaining antinuclear activists replied that they did not 
regard the pursuit of personal safety as worthwhile or that 
they had not made any decisions based on concerns about 
nuclear war. The only other group in which a substantial 
number answered this question affirmatively was the 
Prodefense Activist group. Four of these individuals have 
or are currently constructing fallout shelters. Two other 
subjects reported that they had built shelters in the past, 
but are no longer concerned about nuclear war and have 
abandoned their shelters. 
In the two groups of Nonactive subjects, only three 
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people reported decisions or behavior based on concern 
about nuclear war. One member of the Prodefense Nonactive 
group recently completed a fallout shelter. In the 
Antinuclear Nonactive group, two said career decisions had 
been made in part because of apprehension about the future. 
(One became a teacher in order to influence change in 
younger generations and the other said that the fear of 
nuclear war had undermined her enthusiasm for life and 
interfered with career planning.) The remainder of the 
subjects in these two groups (n = 27) said that nuclear war 
had never played a role in any decision about the future. 
To summarize, concern about nuclear war prompted four 
people in the Prodefense Active group and one in the 
Prodefense Nonactive group to construct personal shelters. 
Each of these individuals believes that nuclear war is very 
probable but survivable with proper preparation. Two other 
subjects in the former group had once built shelters, but 
no longer feel they are necessary. Only in the Antinuclear 
Active group did a majority report having made important 
decisions {i.e., to become activists) based on concern 
about nuclear war. Finally, two Antinuclear Nonactive 
subjects indicated that nuclear war had affected their 
career plans in some way. 
5. Have you given any thought or made any preparations for 
the safety of yourself and your family in the event of 
nuclear war? 
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Not surprisingly, responses to this inquiry were 
divided along Prodefense and Antinuclear lines. For those 
who advocate an antinuclear position, surviving nuclear war 
is viewed as a very improbable, even undesirable, outcome. 
They unanimously reject survival planning of any type and 
use terms like "futile," "kooky," "naive," and "misguided" 
to describe either personal survival plans or national 
civil defense proposals. In contrast, half those in each 
prodefense group admitted giving some consideration to 
specific plans. Most commonly mentioned were storing food 
and other supplies, building a shelter, and evacuation to a 
safer area. Only five, however, are currently making 
concrete preparations (i.e., constructing or stocking 
shelters) . 
Those prodefense subjects who have made no survival or 
safety preparations (n = 25) base their reasoning on a 
different rationale than antinuclear subjects. Most simply 
believe that nuclear war is too unlikely to warrant such 
effort, and, if it did happen, they generally do not accept 
the catastrophic scenarios often used to portray nuclear 
war. Follow-up questions revealed that in most cases these 
subjects view "survivalism" with a measure skeptical 
amusement. 
6. What, if anything, can the average person do to protect 
himself or herself from the effects of nuclear war? 
On this item, antinuclear subjects were again 
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unanimous that the only real protection from nuclear war is 
prevention. They view defensive or protective measures as 
a "frivolous" or "misguided" use of resources. Many would 
allow that personal or collective efforts may provide 
short-term survival for small numbers of people, but they 
regard long-term survival as very unlikely in the wake of 
environmental calamity, nuclear winter, and social 
collapse. 
A greater diversity of opinions was reported by the 
members of the prodefense groups. Among Prodefense 
Activists, half mentioned some type of personal effort 
(e.g., building shelters, storing supplies, etc.) and half 
advocated public or political activities (e.g, supporting a 
strong military, lobbying for civil defense programs or 
SDI, etc.}. Many of the latter persuasion view personal 
survival efforts as useless. (In this view, civil defense 
is seen as less valuable to maintain lives than as a 
deterrent to outside aggression. The rationale is that 
aggression is minimized against nations that are well 
prepared to defend themselves against attack. Because of 
their emphasis on deterrence and involvement in the 
political process to promote these programs these subjects 
share somewhat similar views to those in the antinuclear 
camp, namely that prevention, rather than self-protection 
is the surest way to avoid nuclear war. They differ, 
however, on what the best methods of prevention are.) 
This question revealed somewhat greater differences 
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between Prodefense Activists and Prodefense Nonactivists 
than most others. Many Nonactivists (n = 9) also mentioned 
some type of individual effort as potentially useful, but 
their recommendations were less specific and more tentative 
(e.g, "go to a bomb shelter if you can find one," "a bomb 
shelter might help," "move to the country," "be a 
survivalist"). In fact, most said they found these 
strategies unappealing and couldn't see themselves doing 
such things. A second difference between the prodefense 
groups was that where half the Activists advocated 
political lobbying to promote deterrence programs, only two 
Nonactivists mentioned this approach. The remaining 
Nonactivists (n = 4) said that people could do little or 
nothing to protect themselves. Prodefense Nonactivists, 
then, seem to be less confident about individual efforts, 
either to promote personal survival or through involvement 
in the political process. 
7. What, if anything, can the average person do to help 
prevent nuclear war from occurring? 
Responses to this question were markedly different for 
Position (Antinuclear or Prodefense) and to a lesser extent 
for Activity (Active or Nonactive) . All but one person in 
the Prodefense Active group had at least one recommendation 
for preventing nuclear war and many cited several. By a 
large majority, this group believes that a credible 
military deterrence is the most effective way to avoid 
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nuclear war. Almost unanimously they agree that political 
lobbying on behalf of a strong military is the best 
strategy, but interestingly, only two mentioned 
organizational membership as an effective vehicle to 
achieve these goals. Most cited specific programs such as 
SDI and civil defense which they regard as defensive, 
nonthreatening deterrents to aggression. 
Prodefense Nonactivists, on the other hand, were less 
likely to view prevention as an objective to which the 
average person can contribute. More than half (n = 8) said 
"nothing" or "very little" in response to this query. Those 
who did offer suggestions generally commended the value of 
deterrence programs, but without actually identifying how 
the average person could play a role. For example, instead 
of saying "Write your congressman and tell him we need SDI" 
(as many Activists did), Nonactivists tended to say things 
like "Support the military" or "Support SDI." Followup 
questioning revealed that few of these subjects had ever 
written to an elected official regarding defense-related 
policies. In other words, as with the previous question, 
while Nonactivists favor many of the same programs as the 
Activists, they seem to have less defined ideas about how 
to give that support. 
On the antinuclear side, Activists and Nonactivists 
demonstrated a similar parallel. Activists generated an 
average of 3 suggestions each, nearly twice as many as the 
Nonactivists. Moreover, the strategies offered by 
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Activists were more specific. While Nonactivists tended to 
mention broad categories such as "political action," 
Activists recommended "learning about the political 
process," "working in a political campaign," "writing 
letters," and "lobby Congress." Nonactivists suggested 
"educating yourself and others"; Activists recommended 
studying world affairs, history, cultural differences, 
conflict resolution, learning to think critically, and 
learning to think globally. Many Nonactivists advocated 
group membership; Activists went into detail about the 
value of group involvement. They pointed out that groups 
provide opportunities to learn and grow, provide emotional 
support, serve as an antidote to hopelessness, and through 
collective effort make large projects feasible. Many 
activists also cited the need for personal change and 
offered examples such as "learning to resolve disputes 
peacefully within the family" and "recognizing how patterns 
of personal consumption affect the world economy." 
8. In your own words, what kinds of nuclear and defense 
policies do you support and why? 
As one would expect, Prodefense and Antinuclear groups 
are sharply divided about the kinds of policies they favor. 
Prodefense subjects are wary of the S.U. and insist on 
maintaining a strong and credible military to deter 
aggression. A large majority in both these groups would 
like to see some type of antimissile system (such as SDI) 
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implemented as quickly as possible. Repeatedly, Prodefense 
subjects appealed for SDI and civil defense programs which 
they believe would greatly enhance deterrence without 
threatening other nations. A total of four subjects (three 
Activists and one Nonactivist) said they could support 
reductions in nuclear weapons if they are bilateral and 
verifiable. 
Virtually all the antinuclear subjects favor weapons 
reductions and decreased military spending. They view the 
weapons systems themselves as more dangerous than external 
military threats and offered many alternatives to the arms 
race. In many respects Antinuclear Activists and 
Nonactivists advocated similar proposals; however, these 
groups differed in at least two ways. First, Activists 
generated more recommendations and their proposals were 
more specific than those of the Nonactive group. For 
example, while all the Nonactivists supported weapons 
reductions, the Activists went further and offered many 
ideas they felt would facilitate or augment such 
reductions. They advocate the development of international 
institutions to oversee arms reductions and to gradually 
assume more responsibility for international security. 
Activists also cited a need for negotiations to reduce 
specific classes of weapons. They spoke about economic and 
social dangers of continuing the arms race and recommended 
a number of areas where they feel money could be spent 
better (e.g., housing, jobs, education, health care, etc.) 
and many recommended programs that would retrain defense 
industry workers for nonmilitary employment. 
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The second major difference between Antinuclear 
Activists and Nonactivists is that unilateral reductions 
were advocated by only three Activists but were mentioned 
by nearly three-fourths (n = 11) of the Nonactivists. 
Nonactivists repeatedly expressed frustration with the pace 
of peace talks and accused U.S. leaders of dragging their 
feet. They believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal far 
exceeds what is necessary for deterrence and suggested that 
significant unilateral reductions could be made without 
jeopardizing national security. Those who favored 
unilateral reductions were asked to elaborate and in most 
cases suggestions were rather vague; however, there was an 
implicit notion of some minimum, but acceptable, level of 
deterrence far below current U.S. stockpiles. The most 
specific recommendations were for eliminating all but a 
small number of nuclear-capable submarines. 
Although those in the antinuclear camp were often 
referred to as "unilateral disarmers" by Prodefense 
subjects, only one individual actually advocated unilateral 
disarmament. In every other case unilateral action was 
seen as a way to accelerate bilateral reductions. One 
subject even recalled Charles Osgood's 1961 GRIT proposal 
for stimulating bilateral reductions through selected 
unilateral initiatives, c.f., p. 13. 
In contrast to Nonactivists' frustrations with the 
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pace of weapons reductions, many Activists expect 
significant arms reductions to be a long and tedious 
process. They, too, are impatient; however, many cited the 
substantial barriers that must be overcome before 
meaningful change can take place. Historical enmity, 
cultural, economic, and political differences, and 
competition for international standing were most often 
mentioned in this regard. 
9. What kind of relationship would you like the U.S. to 
pursue with the Soviet Union? 
Those in the antinuclear groups used words like 
"optimistic", "hopeful", and "exciting" to describle their 
feelings about recent U.S.-Soviet accords. Prodefense 
respondents, in contrast, were "suspicious," and 
"skeptical" of the S.U. and advised "extreme caution" in 
dealing with them. 
Antinuclear subjects in both groups hope for a closer, 
if not "friendly," alliance between the superpowers. All 
expressed approval of Secretary General Gorbachev, of 
glasnost and perestroika, and hope for greater 
liberalization of Soviet society which they believe will 
offer unique opportunities for peace and arms reductions. 
(A note of caution was sounded by a few subjects who fear 
that attempts to restructure aspects of Soviet society 
could have a destabilizing effect, especially if Western 
nations do not match the concessions the Soviets appear to 
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making.) Antinuclear subjects support greater contact 
between people at all levels of both societies and 
emphasized the value of "citizen exchanges." In addition, 
many proposed institutional collaboration through joint 
projects (e.g., space exploration), research, and 
cooperative efforts to resolve mutual problems (e.g., 
environmental degradation and dwindling resources) . 
Deep reservations about the character and objectives 
of the S.U. were voiced by virtually every member of the 
prodefense groups and only five reported any degree of 
optimism about either recent peace talks or changes within 
Soviet society. The prevailing view among both Active and 
Nonactive prodefense advocates is that the S.U. is 
untrustworthy (many asserted that the S.U. has never abided 
by any treaty) and committed to overthrowing Western 
society. A majority believes that the S.U. would prefer to 
achieve their expansionist goals through subversion rather 
than militarily, but a substantial minority believes that 
the S.U. is militarily superior to the U.S. and won't 
hesitate to use force if it sees the opportunity. These 
subjects fear that the S.U. is prepared to capitalize on 
any U.S. weakness and that a strong military posture is 
essential for security. (However, as noted earlier, an all-
out nuclear war is regarded as extremely unlikely.) 
Because of their misgivings about the S.U., prodefense 
advocates are divided on the the wisdom of military 
negotiations. In fact, about half in each group would 
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prefer that the U.S. had little or no official relationship 
with the Soviets. This faction views the s.u. as an 
illegitmate government, evil, and an intractible enemy of 
the U.S. Several likened the S.U. to Nazi Germany and 
recalled Chamberlain's futile efforts to negotiate peace 
with Hitler in 1938. Others see evidence of duplicity in 
the Soviet Union's opposition to SDI. The assertion that 
the S.U. has an SDI program of its own and will eventually 
use it to launch an attack against the West was made by 
several subjects. In short, this faction believes that any 
political or military negotiations with the S.U. are naive 
and destined to be betrayed. 
The other half of Prodefense subjects are no less 
suspicious, but they believe the U.S. has little choice but 
to continue to deal with the Soviets. As noted previously, 
a few individuals in this group expressed a measure of 
optimism that changes within the structure of Soviet 
society might eventually lead to a relationship similar to 
that which the U.S. enjoys with China. They want to 
proceed slowly and cautiously with any accords and "verify 
everything." 
Many subjects in each group used this question to 
raise other issues that bear on the nature and direction of 
Soviet-American relations. Along with hope that the two 
nations will eventually end their longstanding enmity, many 
antinuclear subjects were critical of U.S. leadership. 
They believe the U.S. has been overly cautious and worry 
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that peace opportunties will be lost unless the U.S. takes 
greater initiative. Many fear that Mr. Gorbachev's peace 
overtures will be withdrawn and that more militant elements 
within the Politburo will seize control if substantial 
progress is not made soon in improving East-West relations. 
Aspects of American society were also criticized by 
the prodefense side. At some point in the interviews 
nearly half of all prodefense respondents stated that the 
U.S. has either wittingly or unwittingly materially 
strengthened the S.U. through technology transfer, 
financial assistance, and nonmilitary trade. Congress was 
criticized by several for failing to adequately support the 
military or for being too lenient with Soviet aggression. 
Finally, the antinuclear movement was singled out for 
particular criticism by a number of prodefense subjects. 
Antinuclear activists are regarded by many as naive at best 
and subversive at worst. Antinuclear organizations are 
viewed as misguided and were characterized as "useful 
dupes," "unilateral disarmers," and "world government 
advocates." (Several even asserted that antinuclear groups 
are financed and directed, at least in part, by the S.U.). 
10. What do you consider to be the primary threat to the 
security of the U.S. at the present time? 
In response to this question, interviewees in each 
group identified a number of issues that were felt to pose 
a substantial threat to the U.S. In each group a majority 
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pointed to internal rather than external security threats. 
Among prodefense groups, some form of moral decline was 
cited most fequently. Those that were mentioned more than 
once include drug abuse, AIDS, abortion, greed, divorce, 
and welfare. A few pointed to institutions such as 
Congress, television programming, and public schools that 
were felt to promote moral degeneration. Only three 
subjects (two in the Prodefense Nonactive group) cited 
nuclear war as the primary threat. The S.U. or communist 
subversion was mentioned by four members of the Prodefense 
Active group and by three Prodefense Nonactivists. In 
addition, three subjects in the Activist group regard 
internal subversion ("unilateral disarmers" or "world 
government advocates") as the greatest danger to U.S. 
security. 
Economic and social problems were cited most 
frequently by a majority of antinuclear subjects. Some 
form of economic difficulty (e.g., high debt, deficit 
spending, trade deficit, poverty, unemployment, etc.) was 
nominated by almost half the Antinuclear Active group and 
by three people in the Nonactive group. Problems that were 
mentioned by more than one subject in the Activist group 
included environmental problems, overpopulation, resource 
limitations, drugs, education, and nationalism. Threats 
identified by more than one Nonactivist were education, 
decline in family stability, apathy, and an alienated 
citizenry. Only one person in the Nonactive group and no 
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one in the Active group regarded nuclear war as the primary 
threat facing the nation at the present time. 
Considering the placement of this question near the 
end of a lengthy discussion about nuclear war it is perhaps 
surprising that more people (especially activists) did not 
cite nuclear war as a significant threat. This can only 
reinforce the conclusion that, for a majority of Americans, 
including nuclear activists, nuclear war is no longer 
perceived as threatening as it once was. 
11. Do other members of your family share your interest 
and concerns about these issues? 
Virtually every person that was interviewed reported 
at least occasional discussions about nuclear and defense 
issues with other family members, but only the Antinuclear 
Activists reported frequent family discussions. 
Antinuclear Activists also unanimously reported that their 
efforts were supported and encouraged by at least one close 
relative. In addition, half the members of this group 
stated that their spouse or companion was similarly active 
in antinuclear efforts. Interestingly, no subject in any 
other group reported organizational involvement by a spouse 
or other close relative. 
Slightly more than half the Prodefense Activists 
(n = 8) stated that their efforts were encouraged by some 
family member. The rest characterized their closest 
relatives as largely unconcerned or uninformed. Fewer than 
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half in the Prodefense Nonactive group said they were 
supported by family members and many reported that their 
closest relatives were uninformed, apathetic, or skeptical 
of their beliefs in this area. Finally, most Antinuclear 
Nonactivists (n = 10) reported that their families were 
interested, informed, and held generally antinuclear 
sentiments, but were not involved personally with 
antinuclear organizations. 
Summary 
Qualitative analysis of the interview data indicates 
that, as in the case of the questionnaire results, Position 
(Prodef ense or Antinuclear) accounted for greater variance 
between groups than Activity (Active or Nonactive) . In 
most cases, Prodefense groups differed substantially from 
Antinuclear groups in their appraisals of the most likely 
causes and probable consequences of nuclear war, the 
efficacy of protective and preventive strategies, attitudes 
toward the S.U., and the most important challenges facing 
the U.S. today. In a few cases, the Active and Nonactive 
groups within each position also demonstrated notable 
differences. 
Subjects in the Antinuclear groups were divided on the 
likelihood of nuclear war, but tended to be more 
pessimistic than those in the Prodefense groups. For the 
most part, Antinuclear subjects expressed enthusiasm for 
recent u.s.-soviet peace talks and many said they were more 
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optimistic than at any time in recent years. Of concern to 
these groups are the large numbers of nuclear weapons 
worldwide, the potential for accidents, and the threat that 
regional conflict poses to superpower rapprochement. If 
nuclear war does occur, the most probable causes are 
anticipated to be some type of technical malfunction 
(probably complicated by human error} or regional conflict. 
Those who hold antinuclear attitudes fear that once nuclear 
weapons are used in a superpower conflict, war will quickly 
escalate with catastrophic, global effects. These people 
believe that nuclear war and nuclear technology imperils 
human civilization and they ridicule survival planning of 
any kind. 
Aside from their behavioral commitment to the 
antinuclear cause, Activists and Nonactivists demonstrate a 
number of other differences as well. First, many Activists 
indicated that concern about nuclear war was the primary 
reason they became involved in antinuclear efforts. 
Second, while those in both Antinuclear groups affirm the 
belief that individuals can make a contribution to 
lessening the likelihood of nuclear war, Activists offered 
much more specific suggestions including the benefits of 
organizational affiliation. Third, although they favor 
many of the same military and defense proposals (decreased 
military spending, arms reduction treaties, etc.} the 
Activists typically offered more detailed suggestions and 
provided more elaborate explanations for the programs they 
support. Nonactive subjects seemed to be much more 
impatient with the pace of arms reductions and more than 
two-thirds advocated some type of unilateral reductions. 
Finally, Activists reported greater family support and 
fully half said their spouse or companion was equally 
involved in the antinuclear movement. 
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By a large majority, Prodefense subjects believe 
nuclear war is very unlikely, at least in the near future. 
Unlike those in the Antinuclear groups, these subjects are 
not reassured by arms negotiation treaties between the 
superpowers. Indeed, they are far more concerned about the 
Soviet Union than about nuclear war and half in each 
Prodefense group oppose any military negotiations with the 
Soviets. Perhaps the most common theme in the interviews 
with Prodefense subjects was suspicion and hostility toward 
the S.U. and virtually every individual expressed deep 
misgivings about some aspect of Soviet society or 
leadership. 
Even though they do not believe nuclear war is likely, 
when asked to identify a most probable cause Prodefense 
supporters point to the danger of Soviet aggression. Most 
expect the Soviets to behave rationally, however, and a 
commitment to military preparedness is seen as an 
historically proven deterrent to Soviet adventurism. 
Therefore, they support a strong military and criticize 
agencies or institutions (e.g., Congress, Democrats, 
liberals, antinuclear groups, the U.N., etc.) which they 
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feel do not share a similar commitment. 
Like their Active and Nonactive counterparts in the 
Antinuclear camp, Prodefense groups also differ in a number 
of ways. Neither group accepts the idea of a global 
nuclear war with billions of human casualties, nor do they 
believe that personal survival planning is warranted. 
However, should a nuclear war occur, those in the 
Prodefense Nonactive.group are much less confident of 
survival. When questioned about the efficacy of individual 
action to either prepare for or prevent nuclear war, those 
in the Active group provided much more thoughtful and 
numerous suggestions, including advocacy of political 
action; Nonactivists generally felt that most individuals 
can do very little in either case. Another difference 
between Active and Nonactive groups was that the latter 
almost unanimously favored moral problems as the greatest 
threat to the U.S. while the former were evenly split 
between political subversion (either internal or external) 
and moral decline. Finally, many more Activists reported 
that their families were supportive and agreeable to their 
political views. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present study was to provide a more 
complete understanding of the motivational characteristics 
of nuclear activism. Despite the relatively large number 
of psychologically-oriented studies addressing the nuclear 
threat, only four have inve~tigated the conditions that 
promote antinuclear activism and none before this one 
examined prodefense activism. Thus, the intent of this 
study was to add to the sparse data about those who have 
made an active behavioral commitment to the development of 
nuclear weapons policies and to examine the ways in which 
antinuclear and prodefense activists are similar or 
different. 
Superficially, it would seem that people in the 
opposing prodefense and antinuclear camps would differ in 
most respects, and in terms of the policies they support, 
they do. However, because they have distinguished 
themselves through active participation in organizations 
dedicated to political and educational advocacy, they might 
be expected to differ from the general population in 
similar ways. For example, active affiliation in their 
respective organizations suggests that nuclear and defense 
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policies are much more salient for these individuals than 
for the public at large. 
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Political activism can be viewed as a continuum of 
participation. At one extreme a relatively small number of 
people are very active in furthering the policies they 
favor, often through some type of organizational 
involvement. Next, perhaps a larger number maintain group 
membership, but are not so committed and do little more 
than provide financial support. Below this is an even 
larger number of people who may hold informed opinions, but 
who have not taken the step to join or support 
organizations that lobby for the programs with which they 
sympathize. Finally, there are those (perhaps the majority 
in the U.S.) who, for whatever reasons, are disinclined to 
pursue organizational affiliation. 
In this conceptualization, political activism of any 
type is assumed to depend on at least two separate factors. 
First, an individual must hold relatively strong opinions. 
Second, activists believe they can make a contribution to 
furthering their beliefs in the public arena. Nuclear 
activists, therefore, are expected to be strongly committed 
to certain policies and to believe that through their own 
efforts, either individually or in concert with others, 
they can influence the formation of public policy. Previous 
research with antinuclear activists supports this general 
conceptualization. Compared to the general public, 
antinuclear activists feel more threatened by nuclear war 
(Locatelli & Holt, 1986; Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Wolf, et 
al., 1986), have more concrete images of nuclear war 
(Fiske, et al., 1983), are more politically active in 
general (Fiske, et al., 1983), and feel more efficacious 
about preventing nuclear war (Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Wolf, 
et al. , 19 8 6) • 
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In order to extend the prior research and gain a more 
accurate description of nuclear activism (both prodefense 
and antinuclear), the present study compared people who 
have made a very strong commitment to their respective 
positions with people who are only nominally involved with 
either prodefense or antinuclear groups. To be sure, 
nominal affiliation entails a relatively high level of 
participation and it is assumed that, compared to the 
general population, those who are only nominally involved 
in nuclear activist groups are still a long way down the 
continuum of activism in terms of the opinions they hold 
and the degree to which they believe individuals can affect 
public policy. 
While comparisons between organizational members and 
the general public have illuminated broad differences, 
comparing the most active and least active (referred to 
here as Nonactivists) group members allows for a more 
detailed characterization of those who hold leadership 
positions within these organizations and who best exemplify 
nuclear activism. For example, a major aim of this study 
was to clarify whether Active and Nonactive individuals 
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differ primarily in quantitative or qualitative ways. That 
is, do Activists possess wholly different attitudes and 
beliefs or do they simply hold them with greater 
conviction? Another possibility is that additional, 
previously unidentified factors motivate those who are most 
active on behalf of their viewpoints. 
Based on previous research, several hypotheses were 
formulated about activists with respect to their attitudes 
about nuclear war and the extent to which individual 
citizens can influence nuclear and defense policies. 
Activists were predicted to make higher estimates of the 
probability of nuclear war, to perceive greater public 
concern about the nuclear threat, and to score higher on 
three measures of efficacy (General Political Efficacy, 
Response Efficacy, and Personal Resources) compared to 
those in the Nonactive groups. Other hypotheses were that 
Antinuclear groups would exceed Prodef ense groups in their 
predictions of the the severity of nuclear war and that 
Prodefense Activists would score higher on Response 
Efficacy than Antinuclear Activists. 
With regard to probability estimates of nuclear war, 
there was a trend toward significance for Antinuclear 
subjects to estimate a higher likelihood for nuclear war 
and an item analysis revealed that on two items, 
Antinuclear groups made significantly higher estimates. 
This contradicts the prediction that Activists would 
provide higher probability ratings. That those in the 
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Activists groups did not exceed Nonactive subjects was due, 
in part, to the fact that Prodefense Activists made 
relatively low probability estimates overall. 
Since Prodefense advocates have not been studied 
before, their views regarding the probability of nuclear 
war were unknown. For purposes of hypothesis-testing it 
was assumed that they would hold similar views to those of 
the survivalists investigated by Tyler and McGraw (1983) . 
Survivalists, it will be recalled, made high probability 
judgements and low severity judgements. Prodefense 
proponents, it seems, view nuclear war as relatively 
improbable and less severe than Antinuclear proponents. 
(It will be recalled that 20% in each Prodefense group 
rated nuclear war as very likely or almost certain and five 
of these six individuals were preparing fallout shelters. 
None of these subjects, however, regard themselves as 
survivalists, and four were strongly committed to political 
activism, something survivalists are disinclined to do.) 
Because the present study did not sample the general 
public it cannot be said that Antinuclear Activists view 
nuclear war as more probable than most Americans. This 
study did find, however, that those most actively involved 
in antinuclear organizations do not view nuclear war as 
more probable than nominal members. One factor that 
moderated the pessimism of most Antinuclear subjects was 
their enthusiasm for recent arms negotiation talks. Almost 
everyone in the two Antinuclear groups reported that they 
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were very encouraged by these negotiations and by the INF 
treaty and many subjects stated they were much less anxious 
about nuclear war since arms negotiations had resumed. 
Thus, it seems very likely that the large majority of 
Antinuclear subjects view nuclear war as less probable now 
than they might have a few months or a year before. 
When subjects described the most probable scenarios 
for nuclear war, responses again fell along Prodefense and 
Antinuclear lines. Prodefense subjects are most concerned 
about Soviet aggression and believe that if it occurs 
nuclear war will be largely limited to military targets. 
Those in the Antinuclear groups are most fearful about some 
type of systems malfunction or of a regional war leading to 
superpower confrontation. Almost unanimously Antinuclear 
respondents expect that nuclear war would be catastrophic 
and they do not expect or want to be among the survivors. 
This points to one of the most fundamental differences 
between the Antinuclear and Prodefense positions. 
Characteristically, Antinuclear proponents are very 
concerned about the nuclear weapons systems themselves and 
are relatively free of hostility toward the S.U. In 
contrast, Prodefense subjects minimize the potential for 
technological or systems failures and express deep 
suspicion, even hostility, toward the S.U. During the 
interviews Antinuclear subjects frequently recalled 
examples of disasters or near-disasters involving 
miscommunication or technical malfunctions. Many cited the 
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civilian airliners that were destroyed by the U.S. and 
Soviet military, the Challenger accident, Chernobyl, and 
reports of mishaps involving nuclear weapons. Others 
expressed concern about the potential for critical computer 
malfunctions and the very short response time in which 
errors can be detected before aircraft are scrambled and 
missiles are launched. Thus, for Antinuclear subjects, the 
complexity of nuclear weapons systems, the large numbers of 
these weapons, and the number of nations possessing and 
striving to posses nuclear weapons makes some type of major 
mishap seem likely. 
When asked to comment about the potential for some 
type of accident to cause nuclear war, very few Prodefense 
subjects expressed concern. Most pointed with reassurance 
to the fact that in more than 40 years of living with 
nuclear weapons no major accident has occurred. Instead of 
fearing nuclear technology, Prodefense subjects believe 
nuclear weapons are essential to deterring Soviet 
aggression. A major theme repeated by virtually every 
Prodefense subject in both groups was that the S.U. is an 
imperialistic nation bent on undermining the West. A 
majority of these subjects stated that the S.U. cannot be 
trusted and more than half opposed any type of military 
negotiation between the superpowers. 
Given these two very different worldviews the policy 
preferences of each side are relatively easy to predict. 
In general, Antinuclear advocates favor anything that will 
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reduce the number of nuclear weapons as well as tensions 
between East and West. They support arms treaties and 
greater cooperation and understanding between the 
superpowers. Those who hold Prodefense views oppose arms 
treaties and believe that maintaining a strong military 
deterrence is the best way to avoid nuclear war. They do 
not trust Soviet intentions and oppose the kinds of 
cooperative arrangements advocated by Antinuclear groups. 
Estimating the likelihood of surviving nuclear war 
depends on the kind of scenario one envisions and, as 
hypothesized, estimates fell along Antinuclear and 
Prodefense lines. Several items in both the questionnaire 
and the interview addressed the issue of surviving nuclear 
war and of making preparations for survival. In every 
case, Antinuclear subjects rejected survival planning 
whether by individuals or through some type of national 
civil defense program. On the other side, those in the 
Prodefense groups were more confident about their own 
personal survival. In the first place, Prodefense subjects 
are less concerned about the possibility of nuclear war and 
they envision less disastrous consequences should it occur. 
At least half in each of these groups has given some 
consideration to what they would do if nuclear war seemed 
imminent, and a few, including four Activists, has actually 
built shelters. 
One seeming contradiction emerged between the 
responses Prodef ense subjects provided in the interviews 
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and on the questionnaire with respect to surviving nuclear 
war. On the questionnaire, Active and Nonactive groups 
recorded similar optimism about survival (fairly likely) . 
Interview responses, however, suggest that Activists are 
more confident about survival than Nonactivists. For 
example, while two-thirds of Activists expressed confidence 
that they would personally survive nuclear war, only one-
third of the Nonactivists did so. The explanation for this 
difference may lie in the way in which the questions were 
asked. On the questionnaire, subjects were forced to 
choose between several estimates of likelihood and an 
equivocal option was not provided. These constraints were 
not present in the interview, though, and a majority of the 
Prodefense Nonactive group said they didn't know whether 
they would survive or not. 
The second set of variables that have been associated 
with nuclear activism relate to efficacy. Studies with 
antinuclear activists have reported mixed results depending 
on how efficacy was measured and what groups were being 
studied. Tyler and McGraw (1983) found that activists have 
greater faith in the ability of citizens to reduce the 
likelihood of nuclear war. Locatelli and Holt (1986) 
examined beliefs about influencing the political process 
and found no differences between active and nonactive 
antinuclear advocates. Finally, Wolf and her colleagues 
(1986) reported that people who hold antinuclear views are 
more likely to endorse the kinds of strategies used by 
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political advocacy organizations (response efficacy) and to 
believe they possess the personal resources (time and 
money) necessary to support their positions in the 
political arena. 
The present study investigated each of these 
constructs either in the questionnaire, during interviews, 
or both. In the cases of General Political Efficacy, 
Response Efficacy and Personal Resources it was predicted 
that those in the Active groups would report greater 
efficacy than those in the Nonactive groups. Only in the 
case of Personal Resources was the hypothesis supported, 
however. Both Prodefense and Antinuclear Activists 
affirmed the belief that they could dedicate more time and 
financial resources to their respective causes than their 
Nonactive counterparts. 
Considering that a fairly narrow range along the 
activism continuum was sampled, it is not too surprising, 
perhaps, that the predicted differences were not found 
between Active and Nonactive subjects. Locatelli and Holt 
also reported no difference on measures of political 
efficacy in their comparison of active and nonactive 
subjects. Once again, however, the interview results do 
not entirely support the questionnaire data. The 
questionnaire items that composed the General Political 
Efficacy (GPE) scale asked about the responsiveness of the 
government to the concerns and influence of ordinary 
citizens while the Response Efficacy (RE) scale had 
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subjects rate the potential efficacy of a number of 
different strategies commonly used by grassroots political 
groups. In neither case did Activists demonstrate a 
greater sense of efficacy. 
In contrast to the questionnaire, two interview 
questions examined protection and prevention of nuclear 
war, areas that also relate to perceptions of efficacy. 
Subjects were asked to what extent the average person could 
either decrease the likelihood of nuclear war or protect 
themselves from its effects. On both items the responses 
of Prodefense Activists greatly exceeded those of Nonactive 
subjects in terms of the number and specificity of their 
suggestions. Moreover, very few Nonactive subjects cited 
organizational involvement as a way of furthering their 
political views. In the case of Antinuclear groups, the 
results were similar. These subjects rejected self-
protective strategies, but with regard to preventive 
efforts Antinuclear Activists gave a greater number and 
variety of quite specific suggestions, whereas Nonactivists 
tended to give general answers. And, as with Prodefense 
Activists, Antinuclear Activists appeared to value 
collective organizational efforts more highly than those in 
the Nonactive group. 
Without the interview data it would appear that the 
most actively involved subjects have no greater sense of 
efficacy than those who are only nominally involved. 
Responses to interview queries, however, indicates 
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otherwise. The simplest explanation for this apparent 
inconsistency is that different kinds of efficacy were 
measured in the questionnaire and interview. It may well 
be that Active and Nonactive nuclear advocates do not 
differ when it comes to the efficacy of general political 
involvement and grassroots political activities, but do 
when it comes to thinking about specific protective and 
preventive strategies. 
This explanation is not really satisfying, though, 
when one seeks to explain the failure of most Nonactive 
subjects to even mention the most basic kinds of political 
and educational activities during the interviews. As noted 
previously, this was much more pronounced for Nonactive 
subjects in the Prodefense camp (many of whom said they 
didn't know any way in which people could contribute to 
lessening the likelihood of nuclear war), but Antinuclear 
Nonactivists also were markedly less likely to endorse a 
range of activities commonly engaged in by antinuclear 
organizations. A better explanation for the discrepancy 
between efficacy measurements is that the free response 
format of the interview provided a truer measure of 
subjects' perceptions and that real differences do exist 
between Active and Nonactive subjects. 
It can be argued that simply asking people what they 
believe about something will result in a more complete 
answer than asking them to rate the value of items 
presented in a menu. Menu ratings do have certain research 
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virtues, but they may also promote a response set that does 
not accurately reflect the subjects' views. That is, 
subjects may endorse views when presented with a forced 
choice selection that they would not offer spontaneously to 
an open-ended inquiry. Because the interviews were 
conducted after the quesionnaires had been completed, 
whatever response bias existed should have been 
demonstrated equally by all groups. This clearly was not 
the case. With respect to the efficacy judgements 
investigated in the interview, Activists were much more 
articulate in their statements about the ways in which 
individuals can cope with nuclear and security threats and 
were much more likely to endorse a variety of political, 
educational, personal, and organizational behavior. The 
conclusion, then, is that while the questionnaire did not 
reveal differences in efficacy between Active and Nonactive 
groups, differences do exist nevertheless. It is hoped that 
future research will investigate this area further, either 
through additional interviews or with more extensive 
questionnaires. 
The final research hypotheses predicted that Activists 
would admit greater concern and thought about nuclear war 
and would perceive greater concern among the general 
public. Analysis of responses found that Antinuclear 
subjects experience greater personal anxiety about nuclear 
war while Activists think more about it than Nonactivists. 
The relatively low level of personal concern among all 
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subjects is consistent with their evaluations of the 
primary threats facing the U.S. today. Despite the fact 
that all the subjects were affiliated actively or nominally 
with antinuclear and prodefense organizations, very few 
regard nuclear war or security related issues to be of 
greatest danger. The large majority of all subjects 
identified various economic, moral or social problems as 
most threatening. Only in the Prodefense Active group did 
a substantial minority point to the danger of political 
instability (either through internal subversion or external 
aggression) as the greatest threat to the security of the 
nation. It is interesting, but not unexpected given their 
worldview, that so many Prodefense Activists singled out 
antinuclear organizations for special criticism. To those 
in the Prodefense camp, the antinuclear movement represents 
a security threat, both because of the views they espouse 
and because they have been relatively successful in gaining 
media attention for their position. 
A final distinction between Active and Nonactive 
subjects might bear on the willingness people have to 
commit themselves to an activist posture. When subjects 
were asked how much they discuss these issues with other 
family members those in the Active groups reported somewhat 
more family support for their work. This was especially 
true for Antinuclear Activists half of whom reported that 
their spouse or companion was equally involved. Overall, 
Antinuclear subjects and Prodefense Activists stated that 
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their closest family members were generally supportive of 
their political views, but those in the two Active groups 
reported more frequent family discussion. Many in the 
Prodefense Nonactive group said that they rarely discuss 
these issues with others or that family members do not 
support their opinions. The present research did not 
investigate this area in detail, but it may well be that 
the support or involvement of other family members is an 
important determinant in the commitment to activism. 
Summary 
In conclusion, differences were observed between 
Antinuclear and Prodefense advocates on a number of 
variables and between Activists and Nonactivists on others. 
Antinuclear proponents tended to regard nuclear war as more 
likely and more severe than Prodefense advocates. A 
central finding of this study is that attitudes toward the 
Soviet Union and nuclear technology are of fundamental 
importance in predicting a person's stance with regard to 
most nuclear weapons and defense policies. Those in the 
Prodefense groups are most concerned about Soviet 
aggression and view nuclear weapons as necessary to defend 
the security of the U.S. These groups also favor defensive 
programs such as SDI and civil defense planning because of 
their perceived importance for deterring aggression. 
Antinuclear subjects, in contrast, hold generally benign 
views toward the S.U., but are very uncomfortable with the 
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technology and control of nuclear weapons systems. 
Efficacy measures showed somewhat equivocal results 
between Activists and Nonactivists. Questionnaire data 
found no differences on measures of General Political and 
Response Efficacy, but interview responses to questions 
about the efficacy of self-protective and preventive 
activities indicated that Activists on the Prodefense side 
felt more efficacious about both prevention and protection 
than Prodefense Nonactivists while Antinuclear Activists 
reported a stronger sense of efficacy for preventing 
nuclear war than Antinuclear Nonactivists. 
The results of this research suggest a number of areas 
for future investigation. It is still not clear what 
distinguishes those who make a strong behavioral commitment 
to nuclear and defense activism from those who are only 
nominally affiliated with these groups. Perceptions of 
efficacy may be one way in which people do differ in this 
regard and it would be useful to examine this area further. 
Another possible factor raised during interviews concerns 
the importance of family and peer support. It seems to be 
the case, at least for antinuclear supporters, that the 
primary involvement of a spouse or other close relative is 
associated, if not instrumental, in the commitment of one's 
personal resources to organizational activism. Finally, 
nationalistic sentiments and attitudes toward the Soviet 
Union appear basic to the positions people hold regarding 
overall security policies. Further examination of these 
influences may yield additional understanding about 
secondary attitudes and behavior. 
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This is a survey about how people think and feel about 
important issues of national security. Your participation 
is entirely voluntary. 
There are no correct or incorrect answers to these 
questions. All that matters is how you think and feel. 
Any answer is correct if it is right for you. 
This research is being conducted according to the 
Ethical Guidelines established by the American 
Psychological Association. Your answers to these questions 
are completely private and confidential. Your name has not 
been recorded and will not be associated with your answers 
in any way. No one will know how you responded except the 
interviewer. For research purposes your answers will be 
grouped with others who have agreed to participate in order 
to learn more about how knowledgeable adults think about 
these issues. 
If you are interested in the results of the study, I 
will be happy to provide you with a summary when all the 
data has been analyzed. It would be appreciated if you 
would not discuss the details of this research with anyone 
until the study has been completed. I will be happy to 
answer any questions you may have at the conclusion of the 
interview. 
Thank you very much for your assistance in this 
project. 
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1. How probable is it that the United States will be 
involved in a nuclear war by the turn of the century? 
not 
possible 
very fairly 
unlikely unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
2~ How probable is it that the United States will be 
involved in a nuclear war within your lifetime? 
not 
possible 
very fairly 
unlikely unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
3. If the United States and the Soviet Union confronted 
each other militarily in the near future, how likely is it 
that nuclear weapons would be used? 
not 
possible 
very 
unlikely 
fairly 
unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
4. How likely is it that nations other than the United 
States and the Soviet Union will use nuclear weapons in 
military combat within the next 10 years? 
not 
possible 
very 
unlikely 
fairly 
unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
5. If nations other than the United States and the Soviet 
Union used nuclear weapons in a regional conflict, how 
likely is it that the superpowers would be drawn into the 
conflict? 
not 
possible 
very fairly 
unlikely unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
6. How likely is it that some type of accident or 
technical malfunction could precipitate a nuclear war 
between the superpowers? 
not 
possible 
very fairly 
unlikely unlikely 
fairly 
likely 
very 
likely 
almost 
certain 
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7. How likely would it be that you and your household 
would survive a nuclear war? 
almost 
certain 
very 
likely 
fairly 
likely 
fairly 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
not 
possible 
8. How likely is it that the United States as a nation 
would survive a nuclear war? 
almost 
certain 
very 
likely 
fairly 
likely 
fairly 
unlikely 
very 
unlikely 
not 
possible 
9. In general, how responsive do you believe the 
government is to the opinions of concerned and 
knowledgeable citizens? 
very 
responsive 
somewhat 
responsive 
mostly 
unresponsive 
very 
unresponsive 
10. How responsive do you believe the government is to 
citizens' opinions about nuclear policy issues? 
very 
responsive 
somewhat 
responsive 
mostly 
unresponsive 
very 
unresponsive 
11. In general, how much does the average person have to 
say about the way the country is run? 
a great 
deal 
quite a 
bit 
a 
little 
very 
little 
12. To what extent do you have the time to work on behalf 
of your beliefs about nuclear and defense issues? 
great 
deal 
moderate 
amount 
small 
amount 
very 
little 
not at 
all 
13. To what extent do you have the financial resources to 
support your beliefs about defense and nuclear issues? 
great 
deal 
moderate 
amount 
small 
amount 
very 
little 
not at 
all 
14. To what extent can the average person decrease the 
likelihood of nuclear war? 
great 
deal 
moderate 
amount 
small 
amount 
very 
little 
not at 
all 
15. To what extent can the average person protect 
themselves from nuclear war? 
great 
deal 
moderate 
amount 
small 
amount 
very 
little 
not at 
all 
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16. Here is a list of things political activists sometimes 
do to further their viewpoints. How effective do you think 
these kinds of activities are? 
Circle the number that corresponds to your answer: 
extremely 
effective 
1 
moderately 
effective 
2 
signing petitions 
writing to public 
officials 
writing to newspapers 
becoming more informed 
not 
sure 
3 
expressing your opinions 
to others 
Joining a group and 
working with others who 
share your opinions 
working in a political 
campaign 
voting in elections 
educating others 
joining public 
demonstrations 
civil disobedience 
moderately 
ineffective 
4 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
1 2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
extremely 
ineffective 
5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
4 5 
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Below is a list of policies that hve been proposed to 
lessen the danger of nuclear war. How much do you favor or 
oppose each of the following? 
17. An anti-missile defense, such as SDI, to protect major 
population ceners and military installations from enemy 
missiles 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
18. Mutual, verifiable freeze on testing, production, and 
deployment of nuclear weapons 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
19. Nuclear arms treaties with the Soviet Union 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
20. A program to relocate people in the event of an 
impending nuclear attack 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
21. Unilateral freeze (by the U.S.) on weapons testing 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
22. Unilateral reduction (by the U.S.) of nuclear arms 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
23. Building and stocking shelters to protect citizens 
from nuclear attack 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
24. A policy of strong nuclear deterrence 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
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25. A policy of "No First Use" of nuclear weapons 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
26. Increased spending on nuclear weapons research 
strongly strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose oppose 
27. Increased funding for non-nuclear weapons 
strongly strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose oppose 
28. A ground based missile defense system to protect 
sensitive military installations 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain 
29. General reduction in military 
strongly 
favor 
30. Withdrawal 
from Europe 
strongly 
favor 
favor uncertain 
of short-range U.S. 
favor uncertain 
oppose 
spending 
oppose 
and Soviet 
oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
missiles 
strongly 
oppose 
31. Stronger controls on the transfer of nuclear 
technology and materials to non-nuclear and Third World 
nations 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
32. Reduction by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. of long-range 
strategic nuclear missiles 
strongly 
favor favor uncertain oppose 
strongly 
oppose 
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33. How concerneq do you think most people are about the 
arms race and the possibility of nuclear war? 
very 
concerned 
quite 
concerned 
a little 
concerned 
not at all 
concerned 
not 
sure 
34. How often do you think about the possibility and 
consequences of nuclear war? 
never seldom sometimes often very often 
35. How worried or anxious are you about the possibility 
of nuclear war? 
very 
worried 
quite 
worried 
a little 
worried 
not at all 
worried 
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1. Why do you believe the likelihood of nuclear war is 
by the year 2000? What leads you to this 
conclusion? 
2. If the U.S. became involved in a nuclear war, how do 
you imagine it might happen? What is the most likely 
scenario? 
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3. If the U.S. were involved in a nuclear war, what do you 
think the consequences would be for you and your family? 
4. Have you ever considered the possibility of nuclear war 
when making decisions about the future such as where to 
live, etc.? 
5. Have you given any thought or made any preparations for 
the safety of yourself and your family in the event of 
nuclear war? If so, what were they? 
6. What, if anything, can the average person do to protect 
himself or herself from the effects of nuclear war? 
7. What, if anything, can the average person do to help 
prevent a nuclear war from occurring? 
8. In your own words, what kinds of nuclear and defense 
policies do you support and why? 
9. What kind of relationship should the U.S. pursue with 
the Soviet Union? 
10. What do you consider to be the primary threat to the 
security of the U.S. at the present time? 
11. Do other members of your family share your interest 
and concern in these issues? Do you discuss these issues 
with other family members? Are there differences of 
opinion? 
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SAMPLE INTERVIEW: ANTINUCLEAR ACTIVIST 
I: On this first question, you said that you think nuclear 
war is "fairly likely" by the turn of the century. What 
kinds of things lead you to this conclusion? 
S: Mostly technical reasons. Basically, it has to do with 
computer viruses, the inability or lack of technical 
ability that the Russians have. I'm sure that if they blew 
a nuclear warhead up over Portland it would be quite 
effective, but take the shuttle, I mean, as good as we are, 
we make mistakes. We're not infallible and mistakes do 
happen. I don't war would be premeditated, it would be a 
mistake. It would be one of those catastrophes. The 
shuttle was overwhelming, and yet, we're supposed to be 
world class. Well, I'll tell you what, the Russians don't 
even have an economy to be world class and because of that, 
that's the likelihood. I think both countries understand 
the implications well enough. 
I: Do you feel it's more likely that the S.U. will have 
some type of a technological failure? 
S: No. I think it's on both sides. I think if we were 
going to have an odds-on bet, yeah, it would be the 
Russians, but it doesn't exclude us, just because of things 
like the shuttle. Engines falling off of jets. I mean, 
come on, we're still first-class in our technology and yet, 
accidents happen. Let's face it. Three Mile Island. 
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We're first-class. The best technology in the world, and 
we have an accident like that. It's not a malicious thing 
between the two countries. 
I: Do you think that something like that could precipitate 
a war between the superpowers? 
S: I don't know. I really don't know, but when you take 
into consideration that between the two countries there 
exceeds 60,000 warheads and in the world there's only about 
2,500 cities, what's a worst case scenario? I mean even if 
they only let go 5% or 3% we're talking about a major 
situation! When you compare a megaton or a gigaton 
detonation with Mount St. Helens and the damage it did, and 
it wasn't radioactive. You take Chernobyl, we don't feel 
it or see it. Some say that the release from Chernobyl 
won't have any effect on our health over our lifetime, or 
maybe it will effect one person in 10 million, that's 
probably true. But the effect of that rise in radiation on 
microorganisms like viruses probably has quite an effect. 
And so then, you have a tremendous amount of new diseases 
which you didn't have before. The viruses can mutate very 
quickly in those kinds of scenarios, so people aren't 
necessarily immune to them. So, you have this whole other 
scenario other than the radiation or the fallout, even in a 
one missile for one missile scenario. You've increased the 
level of radiation minutely and it may not have a direct 
effect on you or me, but you have all of those things that, 
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in turn, will eventually have an effect on us. 
I: I was just reading an article today on the long-term 
health hazards of Chernobyl and the study said there would 
be very little if any measurable effect beyond a few miles 
radius. There was no mention of possible environmental 
effects on microorganisms. 
S: Uh-huh. Look around you. There are viruses 
everywhere. They are effected by ultraviolet rays and so 
on. They change all the time. We catch colds because they 
mutate so quickly. 
I: So, the nuclear war scenario you've outlined may not be 
catastrophic, but it could effect us in subtle ways. 
S: Yeah. Which in turn effects us economically. You have 
tens of millions of people being sick, ten times a year 
more than they were, there are implications on hospitals, 
implications on industry, all kinds of dislocations you 
just don't think about. There's a teacher at school that 
keeps saying, "God, it's too complicated man! I don't want 
to talk about it." That's the problem. The issues today 
aren't cut and dried anymore, they take a whole new way of 
thinking. 
I: I've talked with a number of people recently who have 
built personal shelters or are planning personal shelters 
to protect themselves from nuclear war. What are your 
thoughts about that? 
S: That doesn't do a whole lot of good. I really don't 
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think it does. Look at Hanford; they've polluted the water 
around there. How much canned water are you going to put 
in your shelter? It isn't a reality. We're too tied 
individually to the environment. The environment's too 
important. You can't live for 3 years on bottled water 
unless you have a source that's free from contamination. 
It wouldn't even take a nuclear war. A nuclear disaster of 
any kind would cause tremendous problems. 
I: Do you think there' re any precautions that people can 
take to protect themselves? 
S: Other than moving to another hemisphere, I doubt it. I 
think the best precaution is to read, think, and respond 
politically. 
I: You've anticipated my next question: What do you think 
the average person can do to lessen the likelihood of 
nuclear war? 
S: Read, think, talk, and vote. That's it. We're only 
here having this interview because the Russians decided not 
to push the button today. Nor the Americans. 
I: A number of questions had to do with particular 
policies. In your own words, what kind of nuclear and 
defense policies do you favor? 
S: That's a good question. I think I would answer it in 
this way and that is to cut down our nuclear armaments to 
say 500 to 1000 warheads. I don't think we've ever had a 
nuclear defense and I think 500 to a 1000 would be a 
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defense. I think the best defense we could have would be 
to get rid of our offense. When you think about the number 
of warheads we have and the number of cities there are, 
it's not reasonable. 
I: You said there were 2500 cities. Is that worldwide? 
S: Yeah. 
I: Of what size are these 2500 cities? Are they the 
largest 2500 cities? 
S: Anything of any economic consequence. I did a slide 
one time to represent all of the economic targets in Russia 
and there were about 400 of them that were of any 
consequence whatsoever. And then you had all the warheads 
on our side divided up against the 400 targets and it makes 
no sense whatsoever. Just that experience to me was worth 
reading several books. 
I: Uh-huh. 
S: According to what I've read, the TNT equivalent of the 
average warhead that is pointed at Portland would 
completely fill a string of boxcars that would stretch from 
here to Medford. And there's supposed to be 7 of those 
warheads aimed at Portland. Now, they don't expect all of 
them to get through, but in the best case scenario with 
SDI, one will make it. 
I: I'd like to hear more about your thoughts on SDI. 
S: I think it's good research money spent in the wrong 
direction. I think we ought to be spending that kind of 
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money on research and development, no questions asked, but 
I wouldn't spend it on this system. When you take all the 
nuclear armaments that have been researched and produced 
since 1945 until today, you're talking about 10 trillion 
dollars. Well, what's 10 trillion bucks? You can buy 
everything in the U.S., every building, every pencil, every 
computer, every product, every service, everything for that 
$10 trillion. Everything except the land. Let's say we 
took half of that money and had spent it on education or 
manufacturing processes, consumer products, research on 
dealing with the pesticide problem in food, fuel efficient 
cars, photovoltaics, computers. Where'd the money go? You 
and I can't spend it except on bloated prices. There's a 
whole lot more dollars around the world circulating because 
of our military spending. People have a lot of dollars and 
wonder what to do with them. It's inflation pure and 
simple. So, instead of a car costing 1800 bucks like it 
did in '55, it costs $18,000. It's still the same money, 
it just takes more of it. But see, we didn't get anything 
for it. We have to get back to understanding that the only 
way you can get an economy to move is to produce something 
that someone else can use. All that research is great 
knowledge, but what do you do with it? Some of it has 
worked it's way down, yeah, but if you just take half of 
that money and spread it around and you'll get a whole lot 
more for it. 
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I: I'd like to shift gears for a minute. What kind of 
relationship would you like to see the U.S. pursue with the 
Soviet Union? 
s: I would like to see the licensing of a whole lot of 
technology, computers, photovoltaics, toilets, plumbing, 
you name it, technology transfer. I think in the end we're 
going to be much, much stronger because of the competition 
than where we might have been if we don't let this 
technology transfer take place. I'm thinking of China, 
too. We'll benefit from it because of the competition. 
Americans have always responded to competitive things.· 
Sputnik, the space race, the arms race, Pearl Harbor, World 
War II, we do real well at any kind of competition. 
I: You're saying that by transferring technology to the 
Soviet Union . 
S: And China. 
I: By building them up they will provide competition that 
we need to strengthen ourselves. 
S: Right. We're beginning to respond to Japanese 
competition now. There's something to be said for being 
number two. In the next 10 years we're going to be a real 
different country from what we are now and I think we need 
to speed that process along. Don't get me wrong, the Soviet 
Union can't compete with us now economically or militarily 
and I have a wait and see attitude about glasnost. The 
whole change that is going on there was brought about by 
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technology. Their system is archaic. Just look what a 
computer and a copy machine would do to their system if it 
got loose. The whole world is faxing to one another and 
they have to come along. Right now the people who run 
agriculture in Russia depend on us to give them information 
about what's going on in their country agriculturally. 
It's because they lack the basic tools that I have at 
school to work with 5th graders. 
I: Uh-huh. 
S: The rules are changing. Technology is changing 
everything. The Russians have to start catching up and 
it's to our advantage to help them. There's profit in it. 
We've been cold-warred to death, but everything's different 
now. Everything's changing. 
I: I'd like to ask you a couple of other questions. In 
your estimation, what is the primary threat to the security 
of the U.S. at the present time? 
S: Economics. Interest owed. Anybody who understands 
compound interest and the exponential rate at which 
compound interest increases as debt increases fully 
understands that we are nearly bankrupt. The whole world 
needs to work together to keep the U.S. afloat because if 
they don't, the worldwide economy could collapse. If 
tomorrow, they decided that all oil would be sold in yen, 
we'd be out the window. 
I: Are these things you discuss with other family members? 
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S: Well, my wife and I talk a lot. Not every day, but 
quite a bit. She's been involved in Beyond War and ESR 
even longer than I have. We don't talk about nuclear war 
with the kids; they're too little. The oldest is only 5 
now. And we talk with our family. No one else is really 
active, but we're all in basic agreement, so it's easy to 
talk. Not that I don't mind a good argument now and then 
you understand. 
I: Is there anything else you'd like to add? 
S: No, I don't think so. 
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SAMPLE INTERVIEW: PRODEFENSE ACTIVIST 
I: You believe the likelihood of nuclear war is "very 
unlikely" by the year 2000. I'm interested in what leads 
you to that conclusion. 
S: Well, deterrence, and I don't think the Russians or the 
U.S. wants the risk, really. I think they'd be more apt to 
surround us or threaten us than to start bombing us. 
I: So, you believe the U.S. and the Soviet Union are in 
agreement at to the risk of nuclear war and neither side 
wants to risk that. 
S: No I don't. 
I: If the U.S. did become involved in a nuclear war, how 
do you imagine it might happen? What is the most likely 
scenario? 
S: Probably over some other country, NATO countries, West 
Germany, or something else. I don't think they'd just 
attack the U.S. But we'd have to go to the defense if a 
NATO country was attacked. 
I: So we might go to the defense of one of our allies if 
they were attacked. 
S: Uh-huh. 
I: Who might attack them? The Soviet Union? 
S: Maybe. Just like they went into Afghanistan or 
anything that's nearby. In fact, I'm surprised they 
haven't gone into Czechoslovakia and some of these 
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countries that are trying to get a little more independent 
now, like they did before. Before they took tanks in and 
just mowed them down. 
I: It's been 20 years since the Soviet Union invaded 
Czechoslovakia. If they did something like that today, do 
you think the U.S. would respond? 
S: No. They didn't then. Maybe should've, but they 
didn't. 
I: If a nuclear war were to begin, do you think it would 
happen quickly and unexpectedly, or do you think there 
would be a gradual escalation of tensions? 
S: Well, if they were going to attack, I think they'd do 
it suddenly, because, well, that would give them a better 
chance. Just like Pearl Harbor, they would surprise us. 
I: Do you think there would be any warning signs that 
informed people might be able to see? 
S: I don't know. The element of surprise would be so 
important. They could do so much with a first strike. 
They could practically wipe you out. 
I: You mentioned earlier that it might begin over some 
third country. Do you think that if the Soviet Union were 
planning to invade Western Europe they would simultaneously 
send missiles to the U.S.? 
S: No. I think they'd just go in, like they did in 
Afghanistan until it got to the point that the U.S. just 
had to fight back. 
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I: If there was a nuclear war that involved the U.S., what 
do you think the consequences would be for you and your 
family? 
S: I'm optimistic. I hope we'd survive. First thing, my 
sons would go. It would depend on where they bombed. If 
they just bombed around Portland, we might be able to 
escape to the hills and fight back however we could. I'd be 
optimistic. 
I: What did you say about your sons? 
S: I've got four sons. I'm sure they'd be called right 
away to fight. 
I: Are they in the service now? 
S: No, but three have been in. 
I: You're optimistic about survival? 
S: Uh-huh. 
I: How about long-term survival? What do you think things 
would be like maybe five years down the road? 
S: Well, nuclear war wouldn't last long. It couldn't last 
long. It would be over mighty quick I'd think. So, in 
five years they'd be trying to rebuild whatever's left. 
I: But the war itself wouldn't last long. 
S: I wouldn't think so. 
I: And in five years, survivors would be rebuilding. 
S: Yes. 
I: Have you ever considered the possibility of nuclear war 
when making decisions about the future, such as where to 
live, and so on? 
S: No. No, I don't really think it's very likely, but 
it's something to think about. Switzerland has miles of 
tunnels and shelters to protect their people, so I think 
the U.S. should have something. 
I: You would favor programs like that. 
S: Uh-huh. 
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I: This leads to my next question: What, if anything, do 
you think the average person can do to protect themselves 
from the effects of nuclear war? 
S: I think they can elect people and work for people who 
will keep the country strong and try to prevent war. 
That's the main thing I would try to do. And then at home 
you might try to fix your basement or something in hopes 
you might survive. I guess in Hiroshima some people who 
were under cover did survive. 
I: The main thing is to be active in politics and elect 
people who will keep the country strong? 
S: That's what I think. Peace through strength is the way 
and not to tempt them by weakness. 
I: What do you think the average person can do to help 
prevent nuclear war? 
S: We've got to elect people who will keep the country 
strong. We can talk and negotiate, but make sure we have a 
lot of strength behind us. Negotiate from strength. 
I: In you own words, what kind of nuclear and defense 
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policies do you support? 
S: I would support S.D.I. I think it would work. I was 
just reading an article and the man said when an Afghan 
rebel could shoot down a plane with a Stinger missile he 
didn't see why any technology couldn't work to shoot down 
incoming missiles or whatever. You know, it would be a 
different technology, but when technology can do that, I 
don't see why it wouldn't work. In fact, they have shot 
down a launch in 1984. But now they have laws against 
testing, thanks to our congressmen. Our state's legislators 
have been really bad it seems to me. They make laws to 
stop us from testing. They only affect us, they don't 
affect Russia or anyone else. 
I: So S.D.I. is one program you support. Are there other 
programs you support? 
S: Well, I think we need to keep everything strong, the 
Stealth bomber we should build and the B-1 missile [sic] . 
There's always newer and better things. We need the 
research anyhow. 
I: What kind of relationship do you think the U.S. 
government should pursue with the Soviet Union? 
S: My preference is to be friendly, but verify! I 
wouldn't really trust them, but we can try. We need to 
verify any treaties. 
I: What kind of treaties would you like to see? 
S: Well, the last one they made to get rid of the 
149 
intercontinental missiles, the INF treaty, I would be a 
little worried about that one, and our ability to verify 
it. And I think they should do their best to verify it and 
any other treaties like that. It's good to make them it 
they'll live up to them, but I wouldn't really trust them 
to. 
I: Are you referring to some type of on-sight 
verification? 
S: Yes. That's what they have now. But they have so much 
stuff underground and it's such a big country, and there 
are just certain sites we can visit and they can visit. I 
still don't feel too safe about it. 
I: What do you consider to be the primary threat to the 
security of the U.S. at the present time? 
S: Now I'm a little bit afraid of the weakness within the 
country, the people who would refuse to fight and who would 
refuse to go along with anything the government wants, and 
who want to weaken our defenses. I think that's a danger 
to the country, and for other countries to see. The same 
is true with the C.I.A. Other countries are afraid to 
trust us with their secrets anymore. Some congressmen will 
talk, whatever the secret. Some of our internal problems 
are a danger. 
I: You mentioned Congress and the CIA and people who 
aren't supportive of the U.S., who wouldn't fight 
S: Yes, like in Viet Nam. 
I: Do other members share your concerns? 
S: Not very much. 
I: Is you husband interested in these things? 
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S: Not too much. He always says, "There's nothing you can 
do about them". He doesn't understand my trying to get 
involved in working with these things. My sons are busy 
now. They're working and raising families. They may be 
concerned because two of them have sons, but it's not 
something they're too active in or anything. 
I: Have you had family conversations about these things? 
S: Not too much. 
I: Do your children know how you feel about these things? 
Have you talked with them? 
S: They know I'm involved, but they think I'm wasting my 
time when I'm in there typing and writing letters and doing 
all these things. 
I: Do they disagree with you? 
S: No. I don't think so. They're just not active. Maybe 
they will be at some time, but they're not right now. 
I: This concludes my questions. Do you have any other 
thoughts or comments? 
S: No, I don't think so. I don't feel like an expert on 
any of it. When I went to college I majored in history and 
I think history is one thing, like from Carthage on, and I 
can remember when Chamberlain went to Munich and gave the 
Germans a good part of Czechoslovakia for peace in our 
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time. That was appeasement. And I can remember there were 
Japanese diplomats talking in Washington, D.C. at the same 
time their planes were there to bomb Pearl Harbor. That's 
why I don't have too much faith in negotiating treaties. I 
think they should do that, but at the same time they should 
verify and not trust them. And back it up with strength 
enough that if they don't abide by the treaty we can 
protect ourselves. 
I: Trust is a real problem. Do you have ideas about how 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union can learn to trust each other 
more or do you think that's dangerous? 
S: Well, I could hope it would work. But I want to stay 
strong and verify. And then they aren't the only threat. 
There are a lot of Third World countries and terrorism; a 
lot of other threats besides the nuclear threat, poison 
gas, etc. Small countries can be a threat, too. 
I: And many smaller countries either have nuclear weapons 
or are working on them. 
s: That's true. I don't think the Soviets are the only 
threat. And I think they're also a threat just by 
espionage, in Nicaragua. If they can make it communist. 
And Cuba's communist, and if they can come up into Mexico 
with communism I think they can spread the ideology. 
That's a threat without the weapons even. It's a dangerous 
world. That's why I think we should stay strong. To 
protect ourselves against whatever. 
APPENDIX E 
TABLES 
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TABLE 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Variable 
Age (M) 
Gender (n) : 
male 
female 
Education (n) : 
high school grad 
some college/tech 
college grad 
postgrad degree 
Occupation (n) : 
student 
retired 
homemaker 
skilled/technical 
professional 
fulltime activist 
Political Affiliation (n) : 
Republican 
ANA 
43.9 
7 
8 
1 
7 
7 
1 
2 
1 
8 
3 
Democrat 12 
other 1 
no preference 2 
Liberal/Conservative (n) : 
very conservative 
conservative 2 
moderate 1 
liberal 6 
very liberal 4 
neither 2 
ANA = Antinuclear Activist 
ANN = Antinuclear Nonactivist 
PDA = Prodefense Activist 
PDN = Prodefense Nonactivist 
ANN 
46.7 
9 
6 
3 
3 
9 
1 
2 
12 
12 
3 
1 
1 
5 
4 
4 
Group 
PDA 
50.2 
9 
6 
1 
9 
4 
1 
2 
1 
5 
6 
1 
14 
1 
2 
10 
1 
2 
PDN 
48.9 
8 
7 
3 
5 
6 
1 
2 
4 
4 
5 
13 
2 
4 
8 
1 
2 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF MEAN SCORES FOR PRODEFENSE (PD) AND 
ANTINUCLEAR (AN) GROUPS ON 16 POLICY ISSUES 
Policy 
SDI 
Mutual Freeze 
Arms Treaties 
Citizen Relocation 
Unilateral Freeze 
on Testing 
Unilateral Arms 
Reduction 
Civil Defense Shelters 
Strong Military 
No First Use 
Nuclear Weapons 
Research 
Conventional Arms 
Research 
Groundbased ABM 
Decreased Military 
Spending 
Missile Withdrawal 
Technology Transfer 
Restrictions 
Strategic Arms Treaty 
* p < .001 
PD 
4.83 
2.59 
2.28 
3.34 
1. 66 
1.53 
4.17 
4.73 
3.00 
3.77 
3.93 
4.43 
1. 93 
2.20 
4.60 
3.63 
AN F 
1.57 375.57* 
4.67 60.58* 
4. 63 98.57* 
1. 70 41.38* 
3.87 65.47* 
3.87 75.22* 
1.57 190.12* 
2.17 133.88* 
4.60 27.15* 
1. 47 141.22* 
2.33 45.95* 
2.23 122.95* 
4.73 255.92* 
4.60 108.32* 
4.72 .57 
4.87 26.40* 
TABLE 3 
GROUP ESTIMATES OF THE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR 
BY THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 
ANA ANN PDA PDN 
Not Possible 0 0 0 1 
Very Unlikely 1 2 8 6 
Fairly Unlikely 7 5 3 3 
Fairly Likely 4 6 1 2 
Very Likely 3 1 2 1 
Almost Certain 0 1 1 2 
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